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1 Introduction 
1.1 Proportionality as a standard of review in international investment law 
Arbitration tribunals do from time to time find themselves confronted with situations 
under which they are obliged to balance competing juridical positions, be they norms, 
interests or values. A fundamental issue is thus how such balancing operations should be 
undertaken. A range of methods, otherwise known as “standards of review”, have both 
been proposed and is utilized in practice. One particular alternative is known as 
“proportionality”. This thesis aims to assess to what extent proportionality is, and should 
be, preferred as the applicable standard of review within the field of law known as 
international investment law. The latter currently exhibits a somewhat confused state of 
affairs regarding this issue, a situation that is becoming more and more intolerable as the 
economical importance of international investment law continues to accelerate.  
Over the last 25 years the amount of inflation adjusted world foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflow has increased by approximately a factor of 35, to a staggering 1.7 trillion US 
dollars in 2008.
1
 During the same time span, inflation adjusted world GDP has only 
increased by a factor of slightly below 6.
2
 The economical importance of investments 
across international borderlines is thus on the rise, both in absolute and relative terms.  
With increased economical importance follows increased juridical significance. From 
being a field of relatively light regulatory pressure, international investment law has shown 
a remarkable development over the recent decades. Highlights include the rise of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) from a number of about 400 in 1991 to 2676 at the end of 2008,
3
 
as well as a surge in arbitrational proceedings related to the subject area.
4
 Also, this field of 
                                                 
1
 See UNCTAD Beyond 20/20 FDI Statistics. 
2
 See the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
3
 See the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2009. 
4
 As an illuminating example of this assertion, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
2 
study has increasingly been on the agenda of both commentators and practitioners within 
the international juridical community. 
Even so, the sources of law governing international investments still exhibit a 
somewhat murky relationship. Municipal legislation, so-called investment contracts, 
customary international law, and treaties of both bilateral and multilateral character 
regularly clash in a contest without clearly defined rules of the game. In short; the legal 
structure regulating any single relationship between an investor and the foreign state in 
which his investment is located is currently quite polyphased and generally somewhat 
inconclusive. 
Within such a frame of reference, this paper will, as indicated, mainly deal with 
proportionality as a standard of review in the context of international investment law. The 
overreaching question tried answered is to what extent it presently applies within the sphere 
of this legal subject. As a standard of review alternative possibly employed by an 
investment tribunal in its scrutiny of the claim at issue, proportionality may influence the 
procedure of the court and, through it, the outcome of the case. The question is thus of 
importance both in terms of legal theory, and in terms of factual consequences for anyone 
contemplating an international investment claim. 
 
1.2 Initial definitions 
Having already utilized a number of key words and expressions, this section will seek 
to define them more clearly, as well as introduce some additional terminological concepts 
of fundamental importance. To start off with the basics, the term “foreign investment” 
refers, in principle, to an asset owned by an entity (called the investor) located in another 
country than that of the asset (called the host state). “International investment law” denotes 
the general body of law governing such bilateral ventures. In practise, a lot of controversy 
surrounds both the question of what constitutes an asset, the question of what constitutes an 
                                                                                                                                                    
(ICSID) had in 2009 more than twice as many cases as in 2000 and 8 times as many as in 1995 according to 
its Caseload Statistics.  
3 
investor and the question of location of both the investor and the asset.
5
 Thus, a universally 
accepted definition of “foreign investment” is so far lacking, with the predictable legal 
consequences. There exist a lot of definitions out there of more limited applicability 
though. Article 1 of the US Model BIT of 2004 provides, for instance, an illustrative 
example of such a denotation, valid within the Model BIT‟s sphere of reference.  
A quantity of more concrete proportions is the BIT. The phrase connotes a treaty 
between two states at the level of public international law which aims to set standards of 
protection for (or convey rights to) the investors of the one country with assets within the 
other. As such, they are typically „designed to cover the following five substantive areas: 
(i) definition of investment and investor; (ii) admission of foreign investors; (iii) fair and 
equitable treatment of investors; (iv) compensation in the event of expropriation; and (v) 
methods of settling disputes‟6. 
An instrument not dissimilar to the BIT is the multilateral investment treaty (MIT). It 
is in essence a BIT between more states than two. In this thesis, the term will be used for 
both multilateral treaties open to any state, and multilateral treaties of a more sectorial or 
regional character. As of 2010 there are few MITs in existence despite several attempts to 
create a common set of foreign investment rules of global validity.
7
 The most well known 
are perhaps chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 
the North American states, and the Energy Charter Treaty (ETC) with its strict sectorial 
scope. 
The (potential) host state may also undertake to negotiate a so-called “investment 
contract” directly with the investor. The aim of such a device would be similar to that of 
the BIT and MIT in pegging down some standards of investment protection, but in this 
instance that protection would be based on a contractual relationship between the host state 
and the investor rather than on a treaty valid through public international law. As shall be 
discussed in section 2.2.2, the exact nature and legal significance of investment contracts 
                                                 
5
 See section 2.4 for a more thorough discussion of this topic. 
6
 Subedi, S. P., International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle, chapter 4 page 84. 
7
 See Schill, S. W., The Multilaterization of International Investment Law chapter II section E as well as 
section 2.2.3 of this thesis. 
4 
may be disputed. 
Finally, the term “proportionality” refers to a method for resolving apparent conflicts 
between differing legal norms, principles and values through a three-step trade-off 
procedure. It is often referred to as a legal principle,
8
 providing, as shall be more 
thoroughly examined in chapter 3, a standard against which competing juridical quantities 
can be measured and equated. It should perhaps be stressed at this point that proportionality 
as a concept is in no way unique to international investment law. Indeed, it currently enjoys 
a far stronger foundation in other fields of law than it does here.
9
 This thesis‟ topic is a 
function of proportionality‟s emerging, though not yet completely clarified, position within 
the boundaries of international investment law. 
Additional words and expressions will be identified and defined where and when they 
are needed. 
 
1.3 Delimitations and clarifications 
The scope of this thesis encompasses the utilization of standards of review (in 
particular proportionality) in the context of international investment law. Though other 
juridical subjects will be mined for illustrative material, it therefore, in principle, limits 
itself to an analysis with applicability but within this cited legal discipline. Furthermore, 
standards of review are (as shall be seen) concerned with the juridical process rather than 
with its results and effects. Thus, the forthcoming argumentation will not handle any issues 
of enforcement and continuation (etc.), for instance damage calculations, even though the 
standards of review it discusses may be seen to have an impact on such matters. 
Another crucial distinction that the argumentation of this thesis rests upon is the line 
between a question of standard of review and a question of what is known as intensity of 
                                                 
8
 See for instance Andenæs, M. and Zleptnig, S., Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative Perspective 
chapter II section A part 1. 
9
 Proportionality is for example presently a dominant feature of the law emerging from the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and its importance is also on the rise in both international trade law 
and EU law among other disciplines. See generally section 3.2. 
5 
review or margin of appreciation. While the former question relates to how a tribunal 
should conduct a certain juridical process (the method), the latter is basically a matter of 
how strictly the chosen standard of review should be applied relative to the autonomy of 
the parties to the dispute (the actual application of the method).
10
 As shall be seen, both 
commentators and practitioners often jumble the two questions together, and thereby cause 
unnecessary juridical confusion. While it acknowledges that there exist a certain 
interrelation and mutual influence, this thesis will argue that standard of review and 
intensity of review are separate concepts best reviewed separately. In tune with its scope, it 
will subsequently proceed to address the former and only refer to the latter where clarity 
and consistency so demands.  
Finally, the argumentation of this thesis shall also be delimited against the concept 
commonly known as burden of proof. Though there are links between the burden of proof 
imposed on the parties and the standard of review employed by the tribunal, the discussions 
below are thus limited to an assessment of the latter. The reason behind this demarcation is 
similar to the one concerning intensity of review in that while standard of review issues 
concern a juridical process, burden of proof relates to the application of that process. The 
two concepts are thus essentially separate entities that for the sake of clarity should be 
reviewed separately. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis starts off with an overview of international investment law (chapter 2) 
intended to introduce the main concepts, sources of law and operative methodology of the 
subject. Readers already familiar with the topic may consider skipping the chapter 
altogether. Note though that the main discussions of chapter 5 are based on the terminology 
and approach developed in chapter 2, some of which tackles issues currently considered 
juridically controversial. It may for that reason be prudent to have read the chapter in order 
to be able to adequately grasp the basis of the subsequent argumentation. 
Chapter 3 introduces and develops the concept of proportionality as well as indicates 
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 This distinction will be further clarified in section 3.1.4. 
6 
its current general diffusion throughout international and municipal law. As shall be 
established, proportionality is a standard of review, or procedural framework, utilizable in 
situations where two or more competing juridical norms, interests and values need to be 
equated. Again, readers already familiar with the concept may consider skipping the 
chapter. Since both commentators and practitioners of differing legal backgrounds do seem 
to differ slightly as to their initial understanding of proportionality however,
11
 it is 
advisable that at least section 3.3 is scanned.  
Trying to dodge the pitfalls of an overly theoretical discussion, the argumentation of 
chapter 5 will utilize a constructed investment case as a backdrop. Chapter 4 outlines this 
case scenario between the fictional entities known as the RDA and Xanadu, as well as 
clarifies the topic of the thesis in terms of practical applicability and relevance. The chapter 
also presents a number of assumptions formulated to sharpen the focus of the subsequent 
discussion. 
Chapter 5 contains the main discussion of the thesis in evaluating proportionality‟s 
diffusion and utility within international investment law at the end of 2010. Several 
different fields of applicability are identified (based mostly on the fictional investment case 
outlined in chapter 4) and assessed. 
Finally, chapter 6 is intended to gather any loose ends and provide a conclusion of 
sorts. It shall be shown that though proportionality by no means is cemented in 
international investment law as of today, trends seem to be pulling the standard towards 
increased utility and importance. It will also be argued that proportionality may be 
considered good practice in face of the impending issues international investment law 
probably will revolve around in the forthcoming years. 
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 See section 3.2. 
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2 Foreign investments and international investment law 
This chapter is intended as a short introduction to international investment law per se. 
First, it will outline the field of study by way of some general remarks (section 2.1). 
Second, the sources of law encountered therein will be subject to a brief scrutiny on the 
basis of the historical development of the discipline (section 2.2). Third, the methodology 
that later shall be relied upon, will, to a certain extent, be sketched out (section 2.3). 
Finally, as a starting point for the subsequent discourse, the fundamental though somewhat 
controversial question of what constitutes an investment will be highlighted (section 2.4). 
The latter topic is structurally included among these initial notes because a basic grasp of 
its content is required in order to discern the principal discussion that this thesis primarily 
concerns itself with. It should perhaps too be noted that the wide perspective of this chapter 
to some extent might cause it to foreshadow argumentation further developed later. In such 
eventualities, reference is made to the passage where the argument is examined in more 
detail. 
 
2.1 A brief overview of the field of study 
The basic model of international investment law comprises legal restrictions on host 
state sovereignty in order to attract foreign investments.
12
 Whether or not the implied 
postulate of this model holds true, whereupon a legal system more restricting on state 
sovereignty will attract more investments, is, however, a matter of some debate that will 
not be further addressed in this thesis.
13
 The essential point to be noted is instead that 
international investment law fundamentally concerns itself with granting the investor rights 
he otherwise not would have enjoyed under mere municipal law. The juridical cause for 
                                                 
12
 See Dolzer, R. and Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law chapter I section 3. 
13
 For an in-depth study of the topic, see Sauvant, K. P. (ed.) and Sachs, L. E. (ed.), The Effect of Treaties on 
Foreign Direct Investment. 
8 
such an arrangement lies, as section 2.2 below will touch upon, in the international 
character of the investor-state relation.  
Investments, as opposed to trade, are furthermore economical instruments of long 
time-horizons, often involving substantial financial value both for the investor and for the 
country in which the investment is to be located. Before the investment is made, the 
potential investor therefore often has a powerful bargaining position relative to that of the 
potential host state which he will use to secure as strong a legal protection for his 
investment as possible, insulating it from political risks.
14
 Subsequently however, the table 
is turned. Now the host state sits with the stronger cards through its monopoly on 
legislative power within its domain. At this point, the investor is in essence left with a lot of 
sunk costs that he hopes will yield profit over the investment time-horizon. In the case of 
an ensuing dispute between him and the host state, he must hence rely on the assumption 
that the legal protection he initially attained limits the state‟s potential expropriatory 
interests and/or legislative latitude. 
At its core, international investment law is similar to other jurisprudence in primarily 
concerning itself with the settlement of legal disputes. An analytical challenge presented by 
this field of study though, is that „it cannot be adequately rationalised as either a form of 
public international or private transnational dispute resolution‟15, at the same time as it 
basically transverses the sphere of mere municipal law. Thus, neither national courts nor 
established international tribunals such as the ICJ are inherently equipped to deal with 
international investment cases. Such disputes therefore, have, to date, mainly been handled 
by specific investment tribunals, either established on ad hoc basis or through more 
permanent bodies such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).  
As for the investment projects themselves, frequently large and complex endeavours, 
they often affect many aspects of the society in which they are executed. In juridical terms, 
                                                 
14
 A “political risks” being the risk of unwanted economical consequences of political activity, for instance 
the altering of contract law, expropriation of property or interference or prevention of business transactions. 
See generally Kobrin, S. J., Political Risk: a Review and Reconsideration. 
15
 Douglas, Z., The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, chapter 1 page 152. 
9 
the rules of foreign investment thus often touch upon several facets of municipal law such 
as labour law, environmental law, law of property, and health law among other legal 
disciplines. This begs the question of what will happen in the event of a conflict of laws. 
May the host state do as it pleases with reference to national sovereignty, possibly eroding 
the investment protection of the investor, or is the latter anchored at an international level 
and therefore resistant to municipal legislature? That international investment law to a 
certain extent amounts to a body of international rules is fairly obvious,
16
 but the exact 
content and reach of these, as well as their relative impact, is contested. Thus, an essentially 
unresolved, though fundamental, question of preservation of national sovereignty in 
relation to democratic legitimacy underscores the very fabric of any juridical question 
herein circulated, highlighting the somewhat complex and unsettled nature of this subject. 
In short; international investment law may be characterized as field of juridical study at 
the crossroads of public international law, international economic law and municipal law 
concerning investments. Additionally, a few distinct rules peculiar to its own sphere of 
jurisdiction have evolved throughout the recent decades. This academic province thus blurs 
the distinction not only between national and international law but also public and private 
law. The effects are a high degree of juridical complexity, but also the potential for 
flexibility. 
 
2.2 The sources of international investment law 
International investment law is a relatively new constellation in the juridical sky. Even 
though the foreign investment concept is far from any kind of recent innovation, a separate 
standard of protection for such assets has been juridically conceptualized in its present state 
only during the recent decades: Until after the First World War, investments owned by 
aliens were regulated in the same way as investments owned by the native inhabitants of 
the state; mainly through municipal law. So far, the international juridical community had 
been „primarily concerned with allocating jurisdiction among States, as the only subjects of 
                                                 
16
 See Dolzer, R. and Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law chapter I section 3. 
10 
international law‟17. In the event of a dispute, an investor thus either had to initiate legal 
proceedings before the courts of the host state, or petition his own state for it to pursue his 
case against the host state at the level of public international law. The first mentioned 
alternative is of little desirability since the host state holds monopoly on legislative power 
through its territorial sovereignty,
18
 while to depend on the latter position is somewhat 
risky since there neither is any guarantee that public international law has any standards 
which may be relied upon in the particular case, nor is there any guarantee that the state of 
the investor is interested in picking up the case at all.
19
 
Then came the twentieth century, and with it some historical events that set the wheels 
of international investment law turning. A taste of what would be came already in the Lena 
Goldfields arbitration of 1930 when an international tribunal awarded compensation to a 
private alien claimant against the Soviet Union after that nation had nationalized the 
claimant‟s property during the Russian revolution of 1917.20 It was followed by a few other 
similar cases,
21
 but system did not properly kick into gear until the second half of the 20
th
 
century: The aftermath of World War II left private investors within the loosing states 
frustrated as they lost large bulks of their foreign property in negotiated settlements 
between their countries and the former Allies.
22
 This created political pressure for the 
development of a system that might lead to more secure and predictable multilateral 
investment conditions. At around the same time, the process of decolonization bore with it 
a taking of foreign property on behalf of the newly independent states.
23
 Also the Eastern 
                                                 
17
 Leal-Arcas, R., The Multilateralization of International Investment Law chapter III page 53. 
18
 See Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 7th Edition part III chapter 6. 
19
 There are nevertheless examples of investors choosing this path. See the ICJ Diallo case part III. 
20
 For a review of the award, see Veeder, V., The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: the Historical Roots of Three 
Ideas. 
21
 Mostly between the US and its Latin American neighbours. Note in this context also the importance of the 
earlier so-called Calvo Doctrine formulated by the Argentinean Carlos Calvo. See generally Dolzer, R. and 
Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law chapter I pages 13-14. 
22
 See Dolzer, R. and Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law chapter I page 18. 
23
 See Newcombe, A., and Paradell L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties chapter 1 §1.14. 
11 
European, now communist, nations indulged in this practise.
24
 Further political pressure for 
a more coherent system of international investment law was thus advanced by the (mostly 
Western) states of private capital outflow to better secure the assets of their subjects in the 
future. Also, technological advancement and liberalization of international financial 
markets led to easier transfer of capital,
25
 making the investment world smaller and the 
investment flow greater. In total, several factors now jointly pushed for an accelerated 
development of more advanced regulation on foreign investments, better suited to handle 
the needs of the modern investment community. 
The result was both polyphased and is still pending. Polyphased because several 
relevant and overlapping sources of law crystallized. Still pending because the interrelation 
between these have yet to be finally defined and resolved into a consistent body of 
international investment law. The different sources of law in question can be divided into 
the categories of bilateral treaty law, multilateral treaty law, investment contract law and 
customary law of international investment. Also, municipal law does to a certain extent, 
depending on the question at hand, influence the jumble. Some notes on each category here 
follow. 
 
2.2.1 Customary law of international investment 
The customary law of international investment is perhaps the more disputed of the 
categories both in terms of its relation to the others, and in terms of its content. It is 
regarded as a „source of international law as it expresses an opinio juris within the 
international community that the principle involved has to be accepted as obligatory‟26. 
Traces of it can be glimpsed as far back as the middle of the twentieth century in the form 
of the international minimum standard of the treatment of aliens.
27
 In short; the states were 
(and for that matter still are) bound by public international law to award foreigners within 
                                                 
24
 See Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edition chapter 1 pages 23-24. 
25
 See Kelsey, J., The Denationalization of Money: Embedded Neoliberalism and the Risks of Implosion. 
26
 Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edition chapter 2 page 82. 
27
 See generally Roth, A. H., The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens. 
12 
their jurisdiction a minimum of legal protection along several axes. One such axis covered 
their investments.
28
 The exact content of these minimum standards is disputed, however. 
The dividing line of opinion has historically been (and to some extent may still be) traced 
between net capital exporting states seeking high levels of investment protection through 
internationally binding standards, and net capital importing states seeking to maintain as 
much state sovereignty as possible.
29
 Some consensus seems never the less to have been 
reached in a UN Resolution of 1962 which holds that foreign investment agreements 
entered into by a state must be observed in good faith.
30
 What a demand for “good faith” 
entails with regard to investment law is still not entirely clear though. Suffice it to say that, 
among other things, both principles of fair and equitable treatment
31
 principles of economic 
sovereignty of states
32
 and principles of compensation for expropriation
33
 have, with mixed 
results, been advocated as customary international investment law based on a concept of 
good faith as a minimum standard of the treatment of aliens. 
The UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3281, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, should hereunder be mentioned. This one was perhaps the culmination of 
the developing countries‟ push for a “New International Economic Order”34, and 
endeavoured to provide any host state with substantial juridical latitude against foreign 
investors by, among other things, asserting a principle of permanent state sovereignty over 
                                                 
28
 Some commentators seem to deny that there exist any customary law of international investments at all 
though. See for instance Trimble, P., International Law and World Order page 835. 
29
 Sort of a culmination of this strife might have been the UN Resolution called the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States of 1974. See below for a brief discussion regarding this document. 
30
 See the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 paragraph 8. To what extent a UN Resolution creates 
customary law as evidence of an opinio juris of the international community is a somewhat debated question 
that will not be addressed by this thesis. See Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 7th Edition 
part I chapter 1 section 3 and section 4 page 15. 
31
 See the NAFTA Free Trade Commission Note of Interpretation of the 31st of July 2001 on NAFTA article 
1105(1) as well as McLachlan, C., Investment Treaties and General International Law part II section A. 
32
 See Castañeda, J., The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law page 39. 
33
 See Ripinsky, S. with Williams, K., Damages in International Investment Law chapter 4 section 4.2.1(a). 
34




  The resolution did, however, not get the impact it was envisioned for 
several reasons that will not be delved deeper into here.
36
 Arbitration practise has in general 
not taken much account of it either.
37
 
Related to customary law are general principles of law. The latter expression refers to 
rules accepted as evident by all civilized states.
38
 As seen above also was the case with the 
customary law of international investments, arbitration practice contains several incidents 
of postulates being termed principles of international investment law based on the 
argument that they stem from general principles of law.
39
 Some commentators argue that 
investment law principles founded in general principles of law are weaker sources of law 
than principles funded in customary law though.
40
 The reasoning seems to be that the 
content of general principles of law often is somewhat diffuse and generally manipulative 
according to subjective preferences. Nevertheless, tribunals do continue to find and apply 
postulates of international investment law without discrimination as to the basis of their 
origin.
41
 As for ICSID tribunals, such practice would seem to be in tune with article 42 of 
the ICSID Convention, which states that, unless something else is agreed upon, the tribunal 
shall „apply [...] such rules of international law as may be applicable‟. Also, article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to international law as a factor that 
generally should be taken into account when interpreting (investment) treaties.
42
 
                                                 
35
 See the UN General Assembly Resolution No.3281 ‟The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States‟ 
article 2. 
36
 See Yackee, J. W., Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promise to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality sections III and IV for a thorough discussion of the topic. 
37
 See for instance the Texaco v Libya award paragraphs 23-24 and 29-31, which contains an illustrative 
discussion of the topic. 
38
 See Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 7th Edition part I chapter 1 section 6. 
39
 The standard of full compensation for the expropriation of foreign property is, for instance, based on 
notions of unjust enrichment and acquired rights as general principles of law. See Factory at Chorzów: 
Award on Merits page 47.  
40
 See Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edition chapter 2 section 5.3. 
41
 Ibid. chapter 2 page 86.  
42
 See McLachlan, C., Investment Treaties and General International Law part I section C. The Vienna 
Convention will be further discussed in section 2.3 below. 
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2.2.2 Investment contract law 
Since investment projects frequently stretch over long time spans, involve a lot of 
financial value and are comprised of complex legal interrelations, the investor and the host 
state often find it prudent to enter into contracts regulating the specific project at hand. In 
particular investments relating to the extraction of natural resources by foreign companies 
are often governed investment contracts; for instance so-called concession agreements 
within the field of oil and gas.
43
 The great controversy regarding this source of law has 
been, and to some extent still is, the issue of whether, and to what extent, the state party is 
bound by such contracts when they (as they often do) delimit its territorial sovereignty.
44
 
Another way to put this is to ask whether the contracting parties may choose, with binding 
effect, that an investment contract is to govern their legal interrelation in case of a dispute 
(in other words an inquisition of choice of law). An affirmative answer to this question, 
without any qualifications, is often equated with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
45
 
This one states in its pure form that „agreements and stipulations [...] must be observed‟46. 
Within the context of international investment law, theories of internationalization have, on 
the basis of a concept of pacta sunt servanda as a customary principle of law, been 
advocated to ensure a legal foundation for the binding nature of investment contracts, 
anchored at the level of international law.
47
 Such contracts would hence be insulated from 
of the host state‟s competence to unilaterally alter by changing the underlying municipal 
contract law. If governed solely by the latter, the host state would have such competence as 
a function of its territorial sovereignty.
48
 
It would seem that this so-called internationalization doctrine is both slightly 
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 See Bishop, R., D., International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a Lex Petrolea. 
44
 See Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edition chapter 7 introduction. 
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Treaties pages 375-376 as well as assertions in arbitration awards such as Sapphire v NIOC page 181 and 
Texaco v Libya paragraph 88 among others. 
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 and perhaps also somewhat outdated, however.
50
 This thesis will not 
further address or illuminate it. As for investment contract law otherwise, international law 
does not provide any coherent system regulating the field, thus causing tribunals faced with 
investment contract related issues to rely, at least partly, on other sources of international 
investment law, for instance on the relevant municipal legal system or on any BIT or MIT 
in effect.
51
 The specifics here too lie outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
2.2.3 Multilateral investment treaties 
Though several international initiatives have tried to establish one, no MIT of general 
scope exists in the world of today. A first effort of conjuration was undertaken already in 
1929 by the League of Nations through its Draft Convention on the Treatment of 
Foreigners:
52
 It never made it. An international investment code was then tried included 
within the 1948 outline of the International Trade Organization, but that entity did not even 
get off the drawing board.
53
 Then came and went a few more proposals,
54
 before the 
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 For a fairly comprehensive review of the critique see Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign 
Investment, 3rd edition chapter 7 section 2. 
50
 Instead of internationalization based on a hard concept of pacta sunt servanda, it may be argued that 
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rights. See Alvik, I., Contracting with Sovereignty: State Contracts and International Arbitration chapter 5 
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 In the words of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Serbian Loans Case page 41: 
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based on the municipal law of the same country‟. See also Maniruzzaman, A. F. M., Choice of Law in 
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52
 See Van Harten, G., Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law page 19. 
53
 See Hart, M., A Multilateral Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment – Why Now? page 52. 
54
 Notably the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, the Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property of the OECD, and the investment treaty initiative during the WTO Uruguay 
Round of the GATT. 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 launched 
negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).
55
 Though being a fairly 
ambitious treaty project of some prestige, the MAI too failed to see the light of day 
however, due to a number of reasons that will not be delved deeper into here.
56
 
Subsequently, the push for a MIT of general scope seems to have deflated somewhat 
despite negotiation on the topic within the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round 
at the 2003 Cancun summit.
57
 At the moment, a new effort of conjuration does not seem 
eminent. 
There exist, nevertheless, some MITs of more limited scope out there: In a regional 
context, chapter 11 of the NAFTA has provided foreign investment protection between the 
North American states since 1992, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) encompasses both a Treaty on the Protection and Promotion of Foreign 
Investment and a Framework Agreement on Investments.
58
 In a sectorial context, the ECT 
of 1994 furthermore contains provisions for protection of investments in the energy sector 
of Europe.
59
 Last but not least, the ICSID Convention on the Settlement of Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States establishes a multilateral framework of 
elective procedural rules for conducting investment arbitrations between investors and host 
states party to the convention.  This one has been in place since 1965, and is closely tied to 
the World Bank.
60
 Its scope is, however, entirely voluntary as state ratification of it does 
not provide direct substantive rights to foreign investors. Rather, it provides a binding 
framework for arbitration if both parties to an investor-state dispute agree to utilize its 
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T., The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?. 
57
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 Thus the ICSID Convention, though having an unmistakable impact on 
international investment law of today,
62
 cannot be characterized as a MIT in the true 
meaning of the expression. 
 
2.2.4 Bilateral investment treaties 
The rise and rise of the BITs may very well be viewed as a direct consequence of the 
failure of the international community to produce a MIT of general scope: 1962 saw the 
dawn of a new era in international investment law as the very first BIT, between Germany 
and Pakistan, entered into force.
63
 From there on their number increased slowly to about 
308 at the end of 1988, before it exploded during the 1990s and onward.
64
 As of today the 
BIT complex constitutes a grid between most nations of the world, similar perhaps to sort 
of a nervous system of international investment law: To a certain extent, BITs are 
interconnected through both their relative conformity, and the so-called Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) clauses prominent in most contemporary investment treaties.
65
 These 
provide that the protection of investor rights guaranteed under a certain BIT should be at 
least as far-reaching as the protection enjoyed by investors under all other BITs that the 
host state is party to.
66
 Thereby, the network of treaty relationships plugged into through 
the contracting of a single BIT may have more sweeping consequences for a nation than 
initially foreseen.  
Viewed at the aggregate level, the global effect of the BIT complex is not unlike that 
of a MIT. Some argue that the developing countries, together a prominent force behind the 
collapse of most of the MIT-initiatives, were divided and conquered through the BIT-
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 See Douglas, Z., The International Law of Investment Claims chapter 2 rule 13 section F. 
62
 See Schreuer, C., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Second Edition the Authors‟ Preface to the 
Second Edition. 
63
 See Dolzer, R. and Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law page 18. 
64
 See Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edition chapter 5 page 172. 
65
 See Leeks, A., The Relationship Between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Wider Corpus of 
International Law: The ICSID Approach section II. 
66
 As an example of such a provision, see article 4 of the US Model BIT of 2004. 
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variant of the prisoners dilemma.
67
 Whatever the reason, the outcome is that the BIT 
system currently in force conveys a lot of substantive rights to foreign investors that are 
anchored at the level of public international law. So far this has been mostly beneficial to 
the developed countries of the western hemisphere since they historically have been the 
major global capital exporters. As some developing countries are reaching maturity, 
however, the bilateral character of their treaties may slowly start to kick in,
68
 possibly 




2.2.5 Municipal law 
Being often substantial, complex and costly, foreign investments frequently interrelate 
with the host state society on multiple planes. The juridical aspects of the investor-state 
relationship are thus, to some extent or other, intertwined with municipal law.
70
 In what 
way and magnitude this is the case depends upon the interconnection between the sources 
of law of the specific investment relationship at hand.
71
 Since municipal law often is more 
consistent, exhaustive and inherently capable of regulating all of the aspects of the 
investor-state relation than sources of international law, a minimum position would be to 
assert that municipal law governs any aspects not primarily governed by any other sources 
of law.
72
 Nevertheless, the choice of law question in relation to what extent municipal law 
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 See Guzman, A., Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties page 666. 
68
 See Van Aaken, A., Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection section 5, in 
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69
 For a discussion on this within a NAFTA context, see Alvarez, G. A. and Park, W. W., The New Face of 
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA chapter 11 part VI.  
70
 For instance municipal commercial law, company law, administrative law, labour law, tax law, foreign 
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 See section 2.3 below. 
72
 The ICSID Convention takes a small step further in stating, in its article 42, that a tribunal shall apply host 
state law and applicable rules of international law in the absence of an agreement on governing law between 
the investor and the host state. It would generally seem that ICSID jurisprudence favours the theory of a 
supplemental and corrective function of international law vis-à-vis domestic law. See for instance Amco v 
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is to govern the foreign investment under scrutiny is frequently an area of high dispute that 
still draws a lot of ink in both theory and practice. 
An indisputable position, however, is that municipal law, to a certain extent, 
necessarily must be present at the outset of any foreign investment affair as the law 
applicable to issues concerning the existence and scope of the property rights the investor is 
to be granted.
73
 Furthermore, since there is no coherent international law of contract,
74
 it 
may be that some aspects of any contractually based investor-state relationship also must 
be founded on municipal law.
75
 More specifically, the question of whether the host state is 
party to any investment contract must inevitably depend on some legal system prior to the 
contract, and the municipal law of the host state itself is hereunder an obvious choice.
76
 
Some commentators have argued that it is unsatisfactory to open for the possibility that the 
state party be entitled to rely on its own law to escape from a contract it freely entered into, 
though: Any question of the existence of a contractual commitment should rather be 
qualified as an issue of arbitrability.
77
 This fairly theoretical discussion of a subject with 
deep doctrinal undertones will not be further developed here in a section that merely is 
aimed at highlighting the possible basic applicability of municipal law.
78
 It also falls 
outside the scope of this thesis as such. 
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Commercial Arbitration part 2 chapter II paragraph 539. 
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topic, see Alvik, I., Contracting with Sovereignty: State Contracts and International Arbitration. 
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2.3 Methodology 
As previously stated, international investment law is the name of the body of law 
governing foreign investments in their aggregate. On the individual level however, quite 
dissimilar mixtures of sources of legal authority may govern the specific investment 
relationship at hand. The varying mix-ups of municipal law, BIT law, MIT law, customary 
international investment law and investment contract law constitute legal issues of sui 
generis character. Thus, the particular content of international investment law varies 
considerably relative to the case under scrutiny. Never the less, some common 
denominators and arrangements may be identified. The following paragraphs aim at 
outlining a framework along a few such structural axes, applicable over all international 
investment affairs. 
The various sources of law explored in section 2.2 have, in the lack of a better word, a 
somewhat liquid relationship under international investment law. One possible reason 
behind this fluidity is that international investment law, as opposed to municipal law and to 
a certain extent also public international law and international commercial law, possesses 
no formal backbone of a constitutional character.
79
 How then should a dispute regarding a 
foreign investment be approached? 
An investment dispute may in principle be solved through municipal law in national 
courts. In that case the methodology is given by the national legal system of the state in 
question. This conflict-resolution alternative has limited usefulness when it comes to 
juridical disputes between a state and a foreign investor, though: Since the state party to the 
investor-state relationship enjoys monopoly on legislative power through its territorial 
sovereignty,
80
 it may change the rules of the game, with fatal consequences for the investor, 
as long as it keeps itself within the confines of its own constitutional framework and its 
duties under international law. The investor, fearing the event of a state intervention and 
naturally trying to limit his risks along all axes, must thus either rely on the capacity of 
municipal law for getting the potential intervention overruled, or hope that the shackles of 
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 See Wittich, S., The Limits of Party Autonomy in Investment Arbitration section 2.2. 
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 See Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law 7th Edition part III chapter 6. 
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international law may limit the host state‟s legislative latitude. But because the state party 
in most cases holds the relative expertise on municipal law, since it has the power to adjust 
it and since national courts often will have a tendency to favour the state in a dispute with 
an alien, the investor does generally not prefer the former alternative.
81
 Instead he will try 
to rely on the protection of international law. As a consequence, international investment 
law, as seen in section 2.2, crystallized out of a need for a system to tackle such conflicts. 
Lacking alternatives, disputes regarding international investments are thus usually 
resolved through arbitration, either of the ad hoc kind or within the boundaries of a more 
permanent authority such as the ICSID. In both cases, customary law of international 
investment, whatever its content, must be taken into account due to its overreaching 
character within the context of international investment law per se.
82
 Whether, and to what 
extent, a certain BIT, MIT, municipal law or investment contract should be given relevancy 
however, depends upon the specific investment relationship at hand.
83
 If, for instance, the 
arbitration proceeding in question was initiated under the provisions of a BIT, it follows 
logically that it is the same BIT that primarily must be relied upon as the source of law 
governing that arbitration, both on the substantive and procedural level, as far as itself 
provides for.
84
 Choice of law or similar provisions within that BIT may though 
subsequently, directly or indirectly, draw one or more of the other sources of law explored 
above into the fray.
85
 In the case of a lacuna, renvoi
86
 may be made to the municipal law of 
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The relevant sources of law must subsequently, necessarily, be interpreted before they 
can be applied. As international treaties, BITs and MITs are subject to interpretation under 
article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
88
 Thus they shall in principle 
be „interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose‟.89 The fact that de facto 
lapses have occurred from this method,
90
 does not limit its fundamental applicability. As 
for preparatory work and interpretive statements, such supplementary means of 
interpretation have a tendency to be taken into account if available (which they seldom are, 
with the exception of interpretive statements from the NAFTA Free Trade Commission)
91
 
in accordance with the Vienna Convention article 32.
92
 Since each tribunal is constituted 
for the particular case at hand however, there may be no similar direct reliance on 
precedence in the interpretation process.
93
 Articulations of prior tribunals may nevertheless 
be heeded relative to their persuasiveness. In this context, see also the Vienna Convention 
article 31 paragraph 3 alternative (b) which states that „any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
                                                 
88
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interpretation‟ should be taken into account. 
A few notes about precedence within the ICSID system are at this point perhaps 
merited. The formal starting point here mirrors the one outlined above in that all tribunals 
are established on ad-hoc basis, and are thus not in principle compelled to follow the 
reasoning of prior tribunals.
94
 Recent jurisprudence, however, would appear to somewhat 
calibrate this position by stressing that tribunals have a duty to contribute to a harmonious 
development of international law through adopting, unless subject to compelling contrary 
grounds, any solutions established by consistent case law.
95
 Some commentators argue that 
this constitutes a de facto doctrine of precedence.
96
 This thesis will not further discuss the 
matter beyond pointing out that even if it would go too far to claim that the ICSID system 
relies on a de facto doctrine of precedence, its constituent tribunals at least exhibits a 
tendency to be persuaded by the reasoning of prior tribunals.
97
 Due to the ICSID‟s 
inclination towards taking their appointments very seriously,
98
 that argument is even more 
potent if the prior tribunal in question was an ICSID Annulment Committee.   
Moving on from the interpretation of BITs and MITs to the interpretation of 
investment contracts, such practice is in essence, in the event of a dispute, a prerogative of 
the arbitration tribunal at hand, unless something else is provided for, directly or indirectly, 
by the contract itself (within a provision that in turn also must be interpreted). This follows 
as a logical consequence of party autonomy as the premise for this kind of arbitration.
99
 It 
may here be noted that in terms of establishing the tribunal‟s jurisdiction on the basis of a 
contract, which essentially must be the starting point of any such arbitration, the tribunal is 
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entitled to do so itself through the customary principle known as kompetenz-kompetenz.
100
 
The operative methodology is thereby for the tribunal to decide upon based on the 
arbitration clause that constitutes it. In the event of confusion, the interpretation of that 
arbitration clause may be subject to municipal law at the place of arbitration in accordance 
with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
article V (the New York Arbitration Convention).  
Having now briefly sketched out the interpretive principles of international investment 
law, the only issue left is to embellish on the interrelationship between the different sources 
of law encountered. As already mentioned; by accepting arbitration through a specific 
instrument (for instance a BIT or an investment contract) the parties to the dispute also 
accept the other provisions within that source of law. If it (as often is the case) contains a 
choice of law provision listing several other sources of law as relevant, then all of these 
must also be taken into account by the tribunal.
101
 The subsequent ranking and application 
of those sources is but a process of interpretation as has been explored just above. 
Furthermore, the different sources of international investment law are at the outset 
complimentary rather than alternative in the sense that the application of one does not 
automatically exclude application of the others. This follows from the distinction between 
contract claims and treaty claims laid down in the Vivendi I case and its subsequent 
annulment decision.
102





 also have endorsed the sentiment.  
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In the event of an impossibility to separate a contractual claim from a treaty claim, 
some awards have held that treaty tribunals would anyhow have jurisdiction on the matter 
at hand, implying ascendancy relative to tribunals constituted on a contractual basis.
105
 
Other awards have been reluctant to accept that position whole-heartedly however.
106
 Also, 
a so-called umbrella clause in a treaty may fundamentally affect the question,
107
 though 
such an incidence would exclusively depend on the process of interpretation of the treaty at 
hand, and in essence be outside the sphere of the contract as such. All in all, a final 
clarification on the interrelation between international investment contract and treaty law, 
and through it contract claims and treaty claims, is still pending. 
Though there are both additional methodological issues and a corpulent body of 
literature tackling both these and the matters now presented out there, it would go beyond 
the scope of thesis to further expand on such topics at this point. Suffice it to conclude that 
the methodology of international investment law ultimately may be characterized as 
somewhat inconclusive in its present state. 
 
2.4 What constitutes an investment? 
The question of what constitutes an investment, and therefore is protected under 
international investment law, may to some extent, in accordance with the methodology 
presented above, be directly regulated by the source of law governing the investment 
relationship at hand, be it a BIT, a MIT or an investment contract. Article 1 of the 2004 US 
Model BIT for example holds that „every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
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assumption of risk‟ is regarded as an investment. In practise however, things have often 
gotten complicated as the definition to be relied upon turned out not to be precise enough, 
or even non-existing. 
As an example of the latter, article 25 of the ICSID Convention states that „the 
jurisdiction of the [ICSID] shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment‟. No further definition of “investment” is included. A dispute as to how far that 
investment concept thereby stretches was bound to follow. The disagreement revolves 
mainly around whether or not so-called “portfolio investments” should be covered. These 
are set apart from more the more direct variant of foreign investments by the investor 
being, though owning it, without direct control of the asset.
108
 Thereby it would in principle 
be possible for a national investor to increase the magnitude of legal protection for his 
investment by setting up a holding company for the investment in another state, and the 
same goes for any third country investor with less protection than what he would have been 
entitled to through a different state than his own. Case law regarding article 25 seems to 
have established four criteria for the determination of what constitutes an investment 
(contribution of the investor, duration of the project, existence of operational risk and 
contribution to the host state development).
109
 These will not be further dealt with here.
110
 
It should, though, perhaps be noted that the term “investment” under ICSID article 25 
usually is interpreted autonomously of other sources of international investment law.
111
 
Furthermore, different ICSID tribunals‟ approaches to the question have been, and 
continues to be, somewhat diversified.
112
 
In general, there currently seems to be a certain dispute among juridical commentators 
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whether, in the absence of a clearer definition, only direct investments may be defined as 
“investments”, or if portfolio investments also are covered by the term.113 The criteria 
usually presented to exclude the latter position are that the investment venture must involve 
a transfer of funds regarding a longer-term project of some business-risk with the purpose 
of regular income and with the participation of the investor, at least to some extent, in the 
management of the project.
114
 Precluding portfolio investments from protection, this 
definition would, in turn, limit the previously mentioned nationality shopping problem as 





 as well as chapter 11 of the NAFTA
117
 indeed contain a clearer 
definition of “investment” that definitely includes investments of the portfolio kind. 
Following the historical trend,
118
 it has so far been the net capital exporting states that 
champion a wider definition of the investment concept (in BITs, MITs and in general), 
while the net capital importing states typically have been somewhat more reserved.
119
  
Along a second line of inquiry lies the question of which facets of the investments 
should be given protection. Again, this may be regulated directly by the relevant sources of 
law. In the absence of a precise enough definition however, some manner of general 
concept must be relied upon in the interpretation process: There is no doubt that the 
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tangible side of the asset is protected. This follows logically from the investment concept 
already developed. Furthermore, there seems to be a general consensus that protection also 
stretches over the intangible side of the asset, as well as to any administrative rights that are 
necessary for the operation of the investment project.
120
 In the case of a lack of boundaries 
for the concept of intangibility or the substance of the administrative rights, renvoi may be 
made to municipal law of the host state.
121
 Additionally, arguments stating that pre-
investment expenditures too should be covered by investment protection have been 
advocated. It would seem, though, that ICSID tribunals not have supported this view in 
Mihaly v Sri Lanka paragraph 61 and PSEG v Turkey: Decision on Jurisdiction paragraphs 
67-105. Juridical commentators however, currently appear to be somewhat undecided on 
the issue.
122
 All things considered, the historical trend has been to add more and more 
facets of the investment concept to the sphere of protection; a practice facilitated mainly by 
the net capital exporting states through the medium of BITs. As was the case concerning 
the evolution of substantive rights conveyed to foreign investors though, this trend might 
start to turn as the bilateral character of the BITs between (the historically) net capital 
importing and exporting states becomes more pronounced.
123
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3 Proportionality 
This chapter will introduce the basic concept of proportionality as such, as well as 
place it within its present juridical frame of reference. The intention here is to provide a 
general definition of proportionality, as well as a review of what the conception embodies 
in its pure form. Chapter 5 will subsequently take the established concept, and assess its 
utility within the sphere of international investment law specifically.  
Starting off with a basic explanation of proportionality in section 3.1, chapter 3 will 
move on to look at concept‟s current diffusion throughout municipal and international law 
in section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will subsequently, to a certain extent, foreshadow 
chapter 5 by on the one hand roughly sketching out proportionality‟s current applicability 
within the specific context of international investment law, and on the other by indicating 
how environmental considerations generally may relate to proportionality. 
 
3.1 The concept 
A tribunal may from time to time find itself in a position where it has to equate two or 
more differing legal positions; be they norms, interests or values. In such a situation, 
assuming that it may not pronounce itself unequal to the task, the tribunal is forced to in 
some way match the positions against one another and award a partial or complete victory 
to one over of the others to the extent of their incompatibility. One obvious question thus 
manifesting itself is how such a procedure should be undertaken. 
The answer to this question may partially be a function of the character of the positions 
to be equated. Adopting the dichotomy of Ronald Dworkin, some juridical positions, 
characterized as rules, apply in an all-or-nothing demeanour, while others, characterized as 
principles, are more relatively disposed.
124
 If faced with a conflict between the former, the 
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very nature of these rules in claiming absolute validity necessarily results in the tribunal 
having to choose absolutely between them, by definition prevented from reaching any kind 
of middle ground decision. This thesis does not further concern itself with such situations. 
Faced with a conflict of principles on the other hand, the tribunal may choose from a much 
wider range of possible structural outcomes since the latter, as opposed to rules, are 
realizable to different degrees, and may thus be balanced against one another.
125
 Balancing, 
in turn, is fundamentally an appealing juridical prospect in that it provides an opportunity 
for flexibility and elasticity, bestowing the tribunal with the authority to take into account 
the entire contextual field in its award and thereby fashion the most equitable judgement 
possible. The flip side though is that the same flexibility and elasticity may raise anxieties 
about whether it awards too much authority to the tribunal at the cost of juridical 
predictability and contractual freedom: Can the tribunal ever truly be constrained ex ante, 
and may it always reach any decision it wants?
126
 Such fears, however, may be mitigated if 
some degree of certainty and stability as to how the tribunal approaches the balancing is 
established. The basic legitimacy questions of consistency and adequate juridical credence 
may thus be adequately accommodated at the procedural level.
127
 The initial question 
outlined above thereby still remains, though: How should the tribunal actually undertake 
the balancing procedure? 
A number of standards of review have been proposed, and a range of alternatives is 
practiced. One specific possibility is known as proportionality. It proposes that the tribunal, 
faced with a conflict between legal principles, conducts an analysis based on a specific 
procedural framework made up of three cumulative steps, thereby ensuring that sufficient 
respect is paid to the positions of both of the parties to the dispute. First, it must assure 
itself that any specific measure advocated is suitable by requiring „a causal relationship 
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between the measure and its objective‟128. Second, it must assess the measure‟s necessity 
by requiring that „the objective, upon which the measure is based, cannot be achieved by 
alternative means that are less restrictive than the measure adopted‟129. Finally, it must 
conduct a proportionality analysis in the strict sense of the word, stricto sensu, analyzing 
„whether the effects of [the] measure are disproportionate or excessive in relation to the 
[other] interests affected‟130. Each of these three steps will be further addressed in turn 
below. It should furthermore already at this point be discernable that proportionality is but 
a method of (or framework for) conducting juridical balancing operations. The concept 
therefore in principle does not, as shall be further discussed in section 3.1.4, concern itself 
with a question of how intensely the tribunal actually should review a measure relative to 




The first step of the proportionality analysis is commonly known as “suitability”. That 
any measure, to possess cogency in relation to the principle it claims applicable, needs to 
be suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective it pursues, is more or less self evident: 
Under any other scenario, the argumentation of the party advancing that measure would 
rest on a logical fallacy in that no causal relationship between the measure and its scope 
would exist. This step is thus intended to insure that the measure advocated is rational in 
relation to its purported end.
131
 Any quantitative or qualitative review beyond mere 
causality, however, is not contemplated at this stage of the analysis.
132
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Note that, as Andenæs and Zleptnig point out, a tribunal will, in the context of 
suitability, also have to determine whether to look at the measure from an ex post or an ex 
ante perspective.
133
 Such a difference in scope might affect the procedure under this first 
stage of the proportionality review, and it might also influence the review under the 
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu stages: In Continental Casualty Company v 
Argentina paragraph 198 (as shall be further discussed below) the tribunal seems to 
consider the measure in question from both perspectives at the necessity stage, prompting 
the question of whether the analysis there undertaken can properly be considered an actual 
proportionality analysis at all. 
 
3.1.2 Necessity 
Having found that the measure in question was suitable, the tribunal next has to 
evaluate whether it was necessary. The necessity test aims at assessing whether the 
measure was the least restrictive reasonably available alternative capable of achieving the 
objective sought. It thus rests on the argument that if faced with a choice of equally 
appropriate measures, the least onerous one should be selected.
134
 Functionally, this 
equates into, first, a question of whether less restrictive reasonably available measures 
exist, and second, a question of whether the measures then considered are equally effective 
in pursuing the objective sought.
135
 In some cases, tribunals of various varieties have 
jumbled both of these questions together with the proportionality stricto sensu test into a 
combined, often somewhat opaque, necessity-proportionality stricto sensu analysis.
136
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Some commentators also seem to endorse such a practice as the proper understanding of 
proportionality.
137
 Under a more sophisticated understanding of the standard, however, the 
first of the mentioned questions sets the scope of the necessity stage by putting the 
emphasis on the comparison between the measure advocated and other, alternative, 
measures, thereby functionally insulating this test from the proportionality stricto sensu 
test. Consequently, any jumbling of the necessity and the proportionality stricto sensu 
stages into one combined analysis will be structurally flawed, and probably best avoided by 
tribunals striving for clarity and consistency. Tribunals following the formal proportionality 
framework would dodge this problem. 
Another crucial component of the necessity test is its inherent reasonability. If absent, 
the necessity stage would almost without exception invalidate the measure in question 
since conceivable alternatives more or less always would exist if their costs were to be 
disregarded. In other words, a measure may be necessary even though it is not 
indispensable.
138
 WTO practice on the necessity stage of the standard of review utilized 
seems to confirm this in stating that „the requirement [...] that a measure be "necessary" – 
that is, that there be no "reasonably available", [...] alternative – reflects the shared 
understanding [...] that substantive [...] obligations should not be deviated from lightly. An 
alternative measure may be found not to be "reasonably available", however, where it is 
merely theoretical in nature‟139. Since surprisingly little theory and practice touch on the 
reasonability component of the necessity test elsewhere, this quote would seem to sum up 
the present state of affairs nicely. 
A subsequent question concerns what the reasonability requirement actually contains. 
Its wording points to an analysis of the costs of the suggested alternative measure relative 
to those of the measure under scrutiny. If the gap is unreasonably large, the alternative 
falls. Note at this point that the reasonability only relates to the party advancing the 
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measure in question. The analysis conducted is therefore functionally separate from the 
proportionality stricto sensu analysis that relates the measure to any norms, interests and 
values of the opposing party. As for the mentioned gap itself, its threshold value will, it 
seems, lacking any formally binding criteria or assertions, need to be determined on a case-
for-case basis. 
Finally, a necessity analysis is almost inevitably a post-hoc assessment by the tribunal 
conducting a balancing procedure. That tribunal thus has, unlike the parties to the dispute at 
the time of an approaching crisis, the benefit of hindsight. If the measure under scrutiny 
turns out successful in limiting or preventing said crisis, the crisis‟ potential may often 
appear less grave in retrospect, thereby reducing the chances of the measure passing the 
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu tests.
140
 While the latter evidently is directly 
affected since it compares the effects of the measure with its adverse consequences, the 
influence on the necessity test is more indirect in altering the course of events relative to 
the perceived development towards the crisis. Thus, the appropriateness, restrictiveness and 
reasonableness of the flora of available measures might appear different in retrospect than 
it did to the parties at the time of implementation of the measure. Any tribunal utilizing the 
proportionality framework should bear this possibility in mind to minimize the chances of 
adverse awards. 
 
3.1.3 Proportionality stricto sensu 
If a certain measure passes both the suitability and the necessity stages, a tribunal 
utilizing the proportionality framework for balancing will then conduct the formal 
proportionality analysis; proportionality stricto sensu. Note at this point that the 
proportionality framework offers a nested sequence of steps: Any measure in question may 
only be reviewed under the next stage if it survived the review under the previous one. The 
proportionality stricto sensu stage will therefore often not be reached since the measure 
under review frequently has been disposed of during the preceding stages. 
Under its proportionality stricto sensu analysis the tribunal examines whether the 
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effects of the suitable and necessary measure are incommensurate relative to any adverse 
consequences it would exercise on other interests affected by the implementation of the 
measure:
141
 Even though the measure was necessary when viewed in relation to possible 
alternative measures, it might still be considered too much when assessed in the context of 
the other norms, interests and values it would frustrate. In an illustrative example of such 
an assessment, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held, in the Stoke-on-Trent v B&Q 
case, that „appraising the proportionality of national rules which pursue a legitimate aim 
under Community Law involves weighting the national interest in attaining that aim against 
the Community interest in ensuring the free movement of goods‟142. In that case, the 
measure in question, the national rules, did not overly hamper the opposing position, the 
Community interests in the free movement of goods, and was thus deemed proportional. 
At this point, the structural difference between the necessity stage and the 
proportionality stricto sensu stage is becoming more discernable. The latter is an 
indispensable part of the proportionality framework in the sense that „any measure at all 
could be presented as “necessary” if the purpose they serve is defined in wide enough 
terms‟143. Thus, the proportionality stricto sensu stage is needed in order for the tribunal to 
be able to, in its balancing process, not only asses the measure under scrutiny against 
alternative measures promoting the same end, but also against other norms, interests and 
values supporting differing perspectives. 
In fact, proportionality even gets its name from the proportionality stricto sensu stage. 
The latter being the modus operandi that separates proportionality from the other standard 
of review alternatives,
144
 it more or less defines the proportionality standard as such, even 
though it, as seen, is but the final test of the three-step framework. This equates into some 
terminological issues: Both commentators and practitioners do from time to time muddle 
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their argumentation (and thereby the debate relating to standards of review in international 
investment law) by using the term “proportionality” without clearly defining whether they 
are referring to the standard of review alternative or the proportionality stricto sensu test 
specifically.
145
 This thesis always refers to the former when it invokes the proportionality 
expression.  
Moving back into the proportionality framework, another question faced is at what 
level the tribunal should place its proportionality stricto sensu review. Should it balance the 
competing norms, interest and values against each other on a principle level exclusively, 
should it take into account the entirety of factual circumstances of the case at hand or 
should it place the review at some point in between? Case law over several juridical 
subjects has shown a tendency to situate the balancing at a fairly concrete level: The ICSID 
articulates a somewhat tangible standard in Tecmed v Mexico,
146
 the ECJ in general seems 
to take into account the specific disadvantages for the person whose rights have been 
frustrated,
147
 and WTO tribunals also have been rather specific when conducting their 
proportionality analyses.
148
 Note, however, that all of the cited practice additionally takes 
into account theoretical argumentation in its assessments. 
The balancing conducted during the proportionality stricto sensu stage should 
furthermore be discerned from strict economic interest balancing. While the latter involves 
a quantitative review of opposing interests equated into a common currency (often 
monetary value), the former encompasses a broader approach of both quantitative and 
qualitative character.
149
 While both options necessarily aim at achieving the most pareto-
optimized result possible given the situation,
150
 their scopes differ: Economic interest 
balancing is, though possibly quite complex, fundamentally only the name of a certain 
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mathematical summation. Proportionality stricto sensu on the other hand, refers to a more 
subtle operation under which both qualitative and quantitative arguments are discerned and 
weighted against one and other. On a more philosophic level, the methods may, 
deterministically speaking, not be fundamentally separate entities. However, in the context 
of this thesis, the difference materializes in that while economic interest balancing refers to 
a process with the articulated aim of evaluating all factors of an issue in terms of an ex ante 
reviewable common currency summation, proportionality stricto sensu makes no claim 




3.1.4 Intensity of review 
Alongside the question of which standard of review it should apply to a balancing 
procedure lies the question of what intensity of review the procedural authority should 
exercise.
152
 Though the latter not is the central topic of this thesis, it nevertheless merits 
some notes in order to clarify the proportionality principle in terms of what it does not 
concern. While proportionality constitutes a procedural framework a tribunal may use for 
balancing two or more competing norms, interests and values, intensity of review refers to 
the rigour of scrutiny the tribunal employs during the balancing process relative to the 
legality of the measures reviewed. In other words, „the question [here] is whether courts 
defer to the justifications provided by the [parties to the dispute] or rather undertake an 
entirely independent review of the measures at issue‟153. The intensity of review, though a 
separate entity, thus influences the standard of review in that a deferential breed of the 
former will dull the edge of the latter.
154
 Other articulations of the issue are whether or not 
a certain provision may be considered “self-judging”, and to what extent the state party is 
awarded a “margin of appreciation” by the tribunal. 
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In any case, the level of intensity to review to be expected applied in any specific case 
is not always obvious up front. While some tribunals, notably the ECHR with its margin of 
appreciation standard,
155
 have developed fairly sophisticated instruments for dealing with 
the question, others, like the WTO tribunals and their objective assessment standard,
156
 
seem to have taken a somewhat vaguer position on the issue. As for the tribunals arbitrating 
under international investment law, they presently do not appear to utilize any very 
common standard for the intensity of review at all.
157
 To complicate the matter even 
further, a tribunal might conceivably address the intensity of review but implicitly, and it 
might also find it prudent exercise different intensity levels at the different stages of the 
applicable standard of review framework.  
Be it implicit or explicit, deferential or rigorous, fixed or differentiated, the intensity of 
review is nevertheless an integral and inherent part of any balancing procedure. While the 
standard of review is the framework governing the latter, the intensity of review is a 
freestanding concept that applies to the actual balancing process at all stages of the 
framework.
158
 Though structurally independent concepts, the intensity of review and 
standard of review do, as seen, influence each other, prompting the sentiment that for the 
one to consistently contribute to certainty and stability in a balancing process, the other 
needs to be adequately clarified. In terms of the impact of the proportionality standard on 
international investment law, this might potentially constitute an issue since no common 
standard for the intensity of review, as mentioned, herein exists. Some commentators argue 
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for the use of the margin of appreciation standard of the ECHR to amend this issue.
159
 
In other words; balancing within international investment law may presently be 
conceptually assimilated with a mathematical equation containing two unknowns: One in 
the form of the standard of review question and one in the form of the intensity of review 
question. To be able to solve such an equation, the unknowns must be pegged down 
separately since they otherwise would influence each other and produce a range of 
solutions rather than a single one. A tribunal, however, is necessarily unable to utilize a 
range of different solutions when faced with one single balancing situation. Thus, the 
unknowns must be untangled and handled up front. The aim of this thesis is to peg down 
the unknown known as standard of review. The second unknown, in the form of intensity 
of review, is a different question that will not be further tackled herein beyond being 
indicated as an issue any arbitration tribunal conducting a balancing procedure necessarily 
also must face.  
 
3.2 Diffusion 
A number of different jurisdictions and legal disciplines have so far embraced 
proportionality analysis as the preferred standard of review to be utilized in situations 
where balancing is merited. This section will provide a brief overview of the diffusion of 
the concept, indicating the level of commitment proportionality is awarded throughout both 
international and municipal law. Note that proportionality in the specific context of 
international investment law is discussed in section 3.3 and chapter 5. 
 
3.2.1 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The ECHR has been in force since 1953, and establishes a basic catalogue of human 
rights that its parties are bound to uphold within their jurisdiction. It has proved to be a 
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remarkably effective and progressive instrument, regularly upgraded through revisions and 
directly administered by the European Court of Human Rights.
160
 Any citizen of the 
mentioned parties to the convention may, provided he has exhausted all national remedies, 
make an appeal directly to the Court in the event of a possible breach of any ECHR 
standard affecting him.
161
 Some of the articles of the ECHR (articles 8-11), however, are 
qualified by a necessity clause holding that the state parties may interfere with the right in 
question when such interference is deemed necessary for certain explicit reasons.
162
 This 
forces a balancing act on any tribunal reviewing any one of those articles. 
In the event of the Court examining the necessity defence of a state party under articles 
8-11 of the ECHR, it will revert to the proportionality standard in the balancing procedure, 
complimented by the margin of appreciation approach to the intensity of review 
question.
163
 The initial source of this doctrine was the Handyside v the UK case, but 
subsequent rulings have refined and explained it. Setting an authoritative example for the 
parties to the ECHR, the Court has thus been a driving force behind the diffusion of 




3.2.2 EU law 
Initiated by the Treaty of Rome of 1959, the first pillar of the EU, often referred to as 
the European Community (EC) pillar, laid down the foundation for the common market of 
Europe by sketching out a blueprint based on a ban on discrimination.
165
 The ECJ have 
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subsequently developed from the ban the principle of proportionality as a basic legal tenet 
when dealing with any kind of balancing procedure within EU law.
166
 Indeed, it would 
seem that there presently exists a certain consensus among the authorities on the latter that 




As was the case with ECHR law, the proportionality standard is perhaps most 
discernable in EU law through cases where derogation is the issue at hand. According to 
article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, for example, a member state may derogate from the 
principle of free movement of goods laid down in article 28 only for certain explicit 
reasons. In its use of proportionality as the procedural method for approaching the 
balancing thereby required, the ECJ further promotes the diffusion of proportionality across 
Europe in a manner not dissimilar to that of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
3.2.3 WTO law 
Proportionality as a required, or even preferred, standard of review appear less 
established in the context of WTO law than it did in the context of both ECHR law and EU 
law: Contemporary commentators seem positioned both for and against the notion,
168
 and 
neither WTO panels nor the Appellate Body have yet conjured up any judgement definitely 
settling the matter.
169
 The issue is particularly acute in relation to public policy exceptions 
such as the GATT article XX and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
article XIV. These allow for derogation from the obligations of the treaties if such is 
deemed necessary for, or relates to, certain explicit reasons, thus forcing a balancing 
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operation on any tribunal considering the provisions.  
The somewhat vague position of proportionality in WTO law is probably at least partly 
due to the Appellate Body‟s tendency to mix the necessity and proportionality stricto sensu 
tests into one jumbled discussion.
170
 The operative decision here would appear to be the 
Korea – Various Measures on Beef case,171 and subsequent rulings seem to more or less 
follow the pattern there sketched out.
172
 It may be, however, that the Appellate Body in the 
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres case in stating that „[the measure 
in question‟s] contribution to the achievement of the objective must be material, not merely 
marginal or significant, especially if [it] is as trade restrictive as an import ban‟173, takes a 
small step further towards a standard of review more formally based on the proportionality 
framework. This thesis, concerning itself mainly with proportionality in international 
investment law, will not further address that question though, at least not beyond noting 
that even though its specific function not is completely clarified as of yet, proportionality at 




3.2.4 Public international law 
Also within the realm of public international law has proportionality been on the 
agenda. A standard of review is hereunder required applied to a range of issues affecting 
the relationship between states, and proportionality holds, as just shown, a fairly prominent 
international position among the possible alternatives. An example of a public international 
                                                 
170
 More specifically, proportionality stricto sensu argumentation is typically imported into the necessity 
evaluation by way of the reasonability component of the necessity test. See ibid. part 6. 
171
 See Korea – Various Measures on Beef paragraphs 164 onward. 
172
 See for instance US – Gambling paragraphs 306-307. 
173
 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres paragraph 210. 
174
 For a more in-depth analysis to the same effect, see Andenæs, M. and Zleptnig, S., Proportionality: WTO 
Law in Comparative Perspective, in particular chapter VI part A section 4. For a critique of the current WTO 
jurisprudence on the standard of review applied to public policy exceptions, see Kapterian, G., A Critique of 
the WTO Jurisprudence on ‘Necessity’. 
43 
law area in need of a standard of review is the law of countermeasures:
175
 Indicatively 
entitled „Proportionality‟, article 51 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states that 
„countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the 
gravity of the international wrongful act and the right in question‟176. The wording 
indicates that a certain balancing procedure is required in the context of reviewing whether 
the countermeasure under scrutiny was wrongful, and also that qualitative factors should be 
taken into account in this review. The latter position necessarily pushes it towards a 
proportionality stricto sensu analysis, and, by extension, the proportionality framework.
177
 
In other words; proportionality will be the preferred standard of review for a tribunal 
evaluating the legality of a countermeasure as it links the mean to the aim pursued and 
assesses the appropriateness of the aim relative to other norms, interests and values 
affected.
178
 In the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) affirmed this role of proportionality with regards to countermeasures,
179
 and used the 
framework thereby established to assess the merits of that case. 
Proportionality might also be said to play a role in many other areas of public 
international law, but to here appraise that entire contextual field would push this thesis far 
beyond its scope. Suffice it to conclude that albeit definitely applicable therein, „it is 
difficult to identify a coherent substantive content of proportionality across the whole range 
of public international law‟180. As was the case regarding WTO law, the concept is thus still 
pending some form of definite juridical acceptance as a fundamental principle of public 
international law similar to the one it enjoys under EU and ECHR law. 
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3.2.5 Municipal legislature 
Although traces of it can be discerned as early as antiquity,
181
 the concept of 





 During the redrafting of the German Federal Republic in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, it was also recognized there as a constitutional principle.
183
 Building 
on German law as well as the emerging case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
and later also of the ECJ,
184
 the principle subsequently spread throughout the European 
countries, first among the countries of Continental law origins,
185
 and then also finding its 
way into Common law traditions.
186
 From there, proportionality has been further diffused 




Given the importance of the US in terms of cross-border investment outflow, a few 
specific notes on the approach to proportionality within US law are perhaps thereby 
merited. Due to its ambivalence towards balancing stemming from the fears discussed 
above in section 3.1, it would seem that the Supreme Court has developed a somewhat 
varied standard of review concept, elastic relative to the underlying right(s) discussed:
188
 
While some areas of law are subject to a fairly thorough standard of review similar to that 
of proportionality,
189
 others only experience the light touch of rational basis testing.
190
 In 
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general it is thus problematic to draw any final conclusion as to the standing of 
proportionality in US law, the lack of which is casting a shadow over the status of 
proportionality in an international investment context due to the prominent juridical 




3.3 Proportionality versus international investment law 
This section is but intended to roughly sketch out the current situation regarding 
proportionality in an investment law context. The more in-depth analysis of the topic is 
found in chapter 5 below. Section 3.3.1 may therefore be viewed as a foreshadowing of 
chapter 5, sketching out the framework of and setting the scene for the main discourse this 
thesis concerns itself with. 
 
3.3.1 A snapshot 
Though still fairly unmapped, the role of proportionality in international investment 
law recently became somewhat less diffuse through the legal aftermath of the 2001 
Argentine financial crisis. Together with the earlier Tecmed v Mexico ICSID arbitration of 
2003, the (so far) 8 arbitrations leading out of the Argentine case complex comprise an 
emerging body of case law touching upon the matter. The cases referred to are: CMS v 
Argentina, LG&E v Argentina, Enron v Argentina, Sempra v Argentina, Continental 
Casualty v Argentina and the ICSID Annulment Committee rulings pursuant to the CMS, 
Sempra and Enron awards. Some statements about the issue are also found in the 
Annulment Committee ruling pursuant to the Vivendi II award. 
The Tecmed award will be further explored in section 5.5.2. As for the cited cases 
involving Argentina, they all derive from a common set of facts. A few notes on that case 
complex are at this point merited to set the stage for the dissection of its functional content 
throughout chapter 5: During the 1990s, Argentina endeavoured democratize and open up 
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its economy by, among other things, embrace the BIT regime, ratify the ICSID Convention 
and privatize an extensive portfolio of State-run companies.
192
 The country also 
implemented a range of legislative reforms to attract foreign investments; including 
pegging its currency to the dollar and promising that capital would be allowed to flow 
freely across its borders.
193
 Then disaster struck in 2001 by way of a national financial 
crisis precipitated by heavy budget deficits, balance of payment discrepancies and 
mounting foreign dept.
194
 To meet that crisis, the Argentine government „adopted a number 
of measures to stabilize the economy and restore political confidence. Among these efforts 
was a significant devaluation of the peso through the termination of the currency board 
which had pegged the peso to the US dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations, 
and the effective freezing of all bank accounts through a series of measures known 
collectively as the Corralito‟195. 
Naturally, foreign investors were bound sustain losses as a consequence of the 
government‟s actions. More specifically, CMS, Enron, Sempra, LG&E and Continental 
Casualty Company all lost their right to calculate tariffs in US dollars and then convert 
them to pesos at the prevailing exchange rate.
196
 They subsequently initiated arbitration 
proceedings before ICSID tribunals on account of Argentina allegedly having breached the 
US-Argentina BIT by effectuating the capital control regime and thereby (among other 
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things) indirectly expropriated foreign property.
197
 As shall be further discussed below in 
chapter 5, Argentina defended itself against those claims by in various ways asserting that 
its conduct was justified under the BIT as a consequence of the severe crisis situation the 
country had been faced with. 
Taking a step back from the concrete exemplification provided by the Argentine case 
complex into more theoretical terrain, it is thus discernable that proportionality may enter 
the investment realm at some specific choke points. Most relevant, in terms of availability 
of case law, is through the evaluation of so-called Non-Precluding Measure (NPM) clauses 
of BITs, MITs and investment contracts. All of the Argentine cases fall into this 
category.
198
 A NPM clause „limits the applicability of investor protection under [a specific 
BIT, MIT or investment contract] in exceptional circumstances‟199. It typically excludes a 
state breach of the BIT under qualified conditions. Proportionality, as a standard of review, 
may be utilized when assessing the qualification requirement of any such condition. 
Second, proportionality might, similar to its function in the evaluation of NPM clauses, 
be considered the standard of review to be utilized in the evaluation of any claim based on 
the necessity defence of article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts. A state, faced with an investment claim, might turn to this 
one as a NMP-like response to escape liability it otherwise would procure. Argentina 
claimed article 25 of the Draft Articles applicable in this way in all of the above-mentioned 
cases.
200
 The relationship between NPM clauses of BITs, MITs and investment contracts 
and article 25 of the Draft Articles will be further discussed below in section 5.3. 
Third, proportionality may conceivably be a procedural factor in evaluating whether 
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the oft-cited fair and equitable treatment standard has been breached.
201
 The function of 
this one is basically to fill any legal gaps regarding an investment relation, securing the 
level of investment protection intended by the legal instrument in question.
202
 In this sense 
the principle upholds the goal of legal stability and predictability. To assess whether or not 
the host state has treated the investor in a fair and equitable manner, it may be prudent for 
the tribunal to take the entirety of the factual situation into account.
203
 If so, the question of 
whether the state actions are to be considered fair and equitable in relation to the affected 
interests of the investor necessarily must be relative to any opposing norms, interests and 
values at issue. This invites a balancing operation that in turn, as seen, must rely on some 
standard of review, for instance proportionality. 
Finally, the proportionality framework might also be utilized as the operative 
procedural framework in any other situation requiring a trade-off between competing 
norms, interests and values. In the Tecmed v Mexico case for instance, the tribunal 
employed a proportionality stricto sensu test in evaluating whether a measure was to be 
considered expropriatory.
204
 It had to determine whether a particular article of the BIT 
between Spain and Mexico covered a certain government decision. Balancing the interests 
of Tecmed against the interests of Mexico under the proportionality stricto sensu test 
turned out to be a key component of this evaluation.
205
 Similar sentiments may in principle 
also be forwarded in any other balancing situation under international investment law. 
In any case, the crucial question at this point is whether and to what extent the 
principle of proportionality actually is utilized by tribunals facing any of the 4 situations 
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now sketched out. This is the main issue of this thesis, and will be thoroughly discussed in 
section 5 below. The structure of that chapter is based on the four lays of applicability just 
identified: Section 5.1 covers NPM clauses, section 5.2 covers the necessity defence of the 
Draft Articles of State Responsibility, section 5.4 covers the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, and section 5.5 covers proportionality in all other contexts.  
 
3.4 Environmental considerations 
Chapter 5 will utilize a constructed investment law case, outlined in chapter 4, to 
illustrate its argumentation. The case is centred on environmental issues, whereupon a few 
notes on how these may enter a balancing context are merited in advance. 
Typically, the environment is considered a so-called public good. Since no one per 
definition can be excluded from the consumption of such goods, their markets often fail 
due to free riding, preference misevaluation and inability to appropriate an adequate 
return.
206
 Public goods may be quite valuable to the well-being and development of a 
society, however. Therefore, governments often find it prudent to address the mentioned 
market failures by regulating the markets of public goods more or less extensively. That 
regulation may in turn influence the rights and duties of other entities operating within the 
government‟s sphere of jurisdiction, though. If the government‟s public good regulation 
affects them negatively, such entities may try to initiate legal actions in order to halt it. 
A court or tribunal faced with an action of the latter variety does, if the legal 
circumstances in question concern principles rather than rules, often find itself confronted 
with a balancing situation. In the case of environmental regulation, environmental 
considerations clash with the (often economic) rights and interests of the affected non-
government entities. In terms of international investment law, a typical scenario would 
involve government environmental regulation limiting foreign investor rights as established 
by a BIT, MIT or investment contract. The opposite scenario, under which it is the investor 
who asserts environmental considerations to support his position, is rather unlikely. 
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4 The scenario 
To make this thesis less of an overly theoretical exercise, an empirical scenario will in 
chapter 5 and beyond be used to illustrate the main argumentation. Chapter 4 will sketch 
out this scenario without getting lost in its details. Section 4.1 introduces the parties to the 
fictional dispute, and section 4.2 sketches out the juridical predicament faced. The 
information presented in this chapter may later be altered if so is required in order to 
illuminate a certain argument or position. Any alterations will be explicitly made clear as 
such at that point though. Unless something else subsequently is noted, the scenario returns 
to its initial configuration after the illumination is complete.  
 
4.1 The parties 
This section introduces the parties to the constructed investment law case that chapter 
5 will utilize as illustrative material. The state party to the dispute is Xanadu, and the 
investor will be known as the Resources Development Administration. 
 
4.1.1 Xanadu 
The khanate of Xanadu
207
 is a sparsely populated independent nation located in a 
mountainous valley of central Asia, and known for its abundant deposits of various natural 
resources. It additionally possesses scenic environs made up of fertile grounds, tree-filled 
gardens, ancient forests and green hills. The nation‟s identity lies chiefly in its image as a 
place of untouched natural beauty, and a number of species of both flora and fauna are 
unique to its domain. Biologists have theorized that the exceptional environmental 
characteristics of Xanadu are due to a vast network of underground rivers and seas that 
provide the vegetation of the valley with an abundance of pristine and mineral rich water.  
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4.1.2 The Resources Development Administration 
The Resources Development Administration (RDA)
208
 is an American corporation 
specializing in the extraction of rare earth minerals, wholly owned by American investors. 
It operates across the globe, and is a large and well-known corporate entity with historically 
a decent, though not unbreakable, financial backbone. The recent global financial crisis, 
however, led to a slump in the general demand for the minerals the RDA extracts and 
refines, in turn negatively affecting its profit margins. Any further unexpected financial 
stress could thus cause severe existential problems for the company. 
 
4.2 The dispute 
This section will sketch out the juridical predicament faced, as well as the course of 
events leading up to the arbitration proceedings. 
 
4.2.1 A conflict of interests 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, a deposit of the mineral known as unobtanium 
was discovered in the sediments of Xanadu. Unobtanium may be refined into a metal with 
the properties of a so-called superconductor, and thus fetches ridiculous prices on the world 
market. The RDA was awarded the right of extraction of Xanaduian unobtanium, and 
subsequently invested heavily in machinery to this purpose, as well as in a refinery and in 
the Xanaduian infrastructure. On its part, the Xanaduian government pledged to not 
interfere with the RDA‟s operations in any way, and to consult with the RDA before 
changing any municipal legislature which might affect them. 
A few years after the RDA began its extraction and refining operations, some adverse 
effects were being observed on the environment of Xanadu. First, the trees of its famed 
gardens turned less incense bearing than earlier, and then the flora in general started 
withering. As a result, several species of plants, insects and animals were fast approaching 
the brink of extinction. Investigations as to the cause of the devastation were conducted, 
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providing the results that the RDA‟s extraction of the unobtanium deposit was polluting a 
high-lying underground water spring, in turn affecting the entire network of underground 
rivers and lakes. Further examinations revealed that it unfortunately would be functionally 
impossible to extract the unobtanium without continuing the pollution of the spring, at least 
unless some ridiculously costly cleansing measures were implemented. 
The Xanaduian government, fearing being blamed for an environmental catastrophe 
and being pressured by a number of international environmental organizations, 
immediately effectuated a ban on extraction of unobtanium, thereby instantaneously halting 
the RDA‟s operations. The RDA, as a result, experienced a sudden decline in operational 
profits and also had to take a heavy financial loss in that its right of extraction of 
Xanaduian unobtanium abruptly became virtually valueless. The company was fast 
approaching the brink of bankruptcy. 
As the investors behind the RDA saw their values evaporating, mediation between the 
RDA and the Xanaduian government was tried initiated. The government absolutely 
declined to in any way adjust its ban on unobtanium extraction however, citing that its 
concern for Xanadu‟s environment was paramount. As a result, the RDA and its investors 
began preparing for legal action against Xanadu on the basis of international investment 
law. 
 
4.2.2 The issue under international investment law 
Between Xanadu and the USA, a BIT was, and had been at the time of the RDA‟s 
investment, in place. The RDA had considered this one effectual enough to not press for a 
specific investment contract during its initial negotiations with the Xanaduian government 
concerning the extraction of the unobtanium.
209
 Furthermore, Xanadu was also a party to 
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the ICSID convention. The RDA and its shareholders thus found it prudent to initiate an 
ICSID arbitration based on the provisions of the US-Xanadu BIT. 




Article 6: Expropriation and Compensation 
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization, except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law 
 
Holding that the ban on extraction of unobtanium constituted a measure equivalent to 
indirect expropriation, the RDA and its investors claimed to be entitled to full 
compensation in accordance with alternative C of this provision. Furthermore, they held 
that the Xanaduian government had breached the fair and equitable treatment standard of 




Article 5: Minimum Standard of Treatment 
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international 
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. If an investor of a Party 
suffers a loss in the territory of the other Party resulting from a breach of the abovementioned standards, 
the latter Party shall provide the investor restitution, compensation, or both, as appropriate, for such loss. 
Any compensation shall be prompt, adequate, and effective. 
 
Compensation in accordance with this article was claimed on the basis of the 
Xanaduian government‟s failure to provide a stable legal and business environment; 
thereby failing to protect the RDA‟s legitimate interests, and due to the government‟s 
failure to act in accordance with its pledges of non-interference and consultation.  
Xanadu did not challenge the claim that the ban on extraction of unobtanium 
                                                                                                                                                    
transfusion value to an investment contract context as well though. 
210
 Based on article 6 paragraph 1 of the 2004 US Model BIT. 
211
 Based on article 5 paragraph 1 and 5 of the 2004 US Model BIT. 
54 
constituted an indirect expropriation in accordance with article 6 of the BIT. It did 
however, assert that no compensation was due since the measure in question was covered 
by both the NPM clause of article 18 alternative 2 of the BIT, and the customary necessity 
defence based on article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 




Article 18: Essential Security 
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: 
1. to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it determines 
to be contrary to its essential security interests; or 
2. to preclude a Party from applying measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests or human, animal or plant life or health. 
 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles stated that: 
 
Article 25: Necessity 
Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in 
conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation 
exists, or of the international community as a whole. 
In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: 
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or 
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
 
Regarding the claim that it had breached the fair and equitable treatment standard of 
article 5 of the BIT, Xanadu alleged that the standard should be assessed in the context of 
the situation. Viewed against the backdrop of preventing a possible environmental 
catastrophe, it therefore could not be considered breached. 
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4.2.3 Further assumptions 
In order to ensure that the scenario now presented stays within the context this thesis 
aims at assessing (that of proportionality in international investment law) some further 
assumptions about the legal procedure between Xanadu and the RDA have to be made: 
First, it shall be assumed that the ban on unobtanium extraction falls within the sphere of 
permissible objectives stated in article 18 of the BIT, thus making the question of whether 
or not the measure was “necessary” the only issue to be evaluated. Given the wording of 
alternative 2 of this provision, such an assumption is probably not too preposterous.  
Furthermore, it shall also be assumed that the ban on unobtanium extraction fulfils the 
similar requirement of scope of the first paragraph of article 25 of the Draft Articles 




Finally, article 18 of the BIT shall be interpreted to mean that it absolves Xanadu from 
the duty to pay compensation in the event of the government breaching article 6. There 
seems to be some theoretical disagreement as to whether article 18 of the 2004 US Model 
BIT does so.
214
 In general, all assumptions to the effect of making the balancing procedures 
inherent in article 5 and 18 of the BIT and article 25 of the Draft Articles the primary issues 
to be debated, eliminating all other possible sources of juridical conflict, are, and should be, 
made. 
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5 Proportionality in the scenario context 
Having roughly sketched out both the sphere of international investment law in chapter 
2 and the concept of proportionality in chapter 3, time has now come to combine the 
quantities by assessing the merits of proportionality within international investment law. As 
was indicated in section 3.3, the question is to what extent the proportionality framework 
is, and for that matter should be, utilized by international investment law arbitration 
tribunals faced with situations where balancing of competing principles is the issue. Section 
3.3 also indicated four possible lays of applicability. This chapter will follow the outline 
there advanced in its analysis of proportionality‟s diffusion, or lack thereof, throughout the 
law governing international investments: First, the preclusion of expropriation context of 
NPM clauses will be discussed in section 5.1. Then, in section 5.2, the customary necessity 
defence of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility will be tackled. In section 5.3, as a 
necessary, slight digression, the somewhat problematic relationship between the standard 
of review question in a NPM context and the standard of review question in a customary 
necessity defence context will be explored. Section 5.4 will return to the initial framework 
by discussing proportionality under the fair and equitable treatment standard, while section 
5.5 seals the analysis by reviewing its significance throughout the rest of the international 
investment law. The scenario outlined in chapter 4 will be utilized as a backdrop for the 
discussion under all sections. 
 
5.1 Preclusion of liability 
Xanadu claims that the NPM clause within article 18 second alternative of the US-
Xanadu BIT precludes any liability the country otherwise would have procured by its ban 
on unobtanium extraction. Since the permissible objectives requirement of this provision is 
presumed fulfilled, the ICSID tribunal assessing the case thus only has to establish whether 
Xanadu‟s action can be deemed to have been “necessary for” achieving that objective. The 
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question is how this should be done. First paragraph of article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
indicates that a natural starting point for such a discussion might be the wording of the BIT. 
Section 5.1.1 will commence from that position in articulating a few general remarks on 
balancing within an NPM clause context. Section 5.1.2 will subsequently present the 
alternative standards of review that might be utilized by the tribunal, and section 5.1.3 will 
indicate which of them currently may be deemed the better supported by the instrumental 
sources of international investment law. Section 5.1.4 will finally round off the NPM 
clause standard of review analysis by evaluating proportionality‟s potential within this 
context on a more fundamental level. 
 
5.1.1 The nexus requirement 
Through the wording “necessary for”, article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT requires a link 
between the measure adopted by the state and the permissible objectives sought reached. In 
other words, the ban on unobtanium extraction must in some way be causally connected to 
the protection of animal or plant life. The articulation of this condition has in theory often 
been termed “the nexus requirement”.215 The nexus requirement may be paraphrased 
differently in different NPM contexts and within differing juridical instruments. “Necessary 
for” or “necessary to” are perhaps the most common terminology,216 but alternatives are 
abundant.
217
 Also, BITs or investment contracts in other languages than English may 
contain NPM clauses with nexus requirements deviating from the “necessary for” 
terminology as a function of inaccurate translations due to linguistic inconsistency.
218
 The 
point is in any case that the nexus may be articulated differently, and that this might, 
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through the methodology indicated by section 2.3 above, lead to differing standards of 
review being utilized in the evaluation of differently worded NPM clauses.  
In fact, even the standards of review utilized under similarly worded NPM clauses may 
differ: Since the wording of a BIT (or MIT or investment contract) provision is but one 
factor of interpretation,
219
 the varying mix-up of sources of law in each specific investment 
case may very well lead to differing standards of review being utilized even between cases 
of similarly worded nexuses. However, on the basis of the Vienna Convention article 31 
first paragraph, it may be argued that similar wording of articles with similar function 
contained in instruments with similar object and purpose should in general be interpreted 
similarly. In light of the general legal aim of consistency and predictability, this 
argumentation would appear to hold a certain intrinsic persuasiveness. Note, however, that 
no tribunal to date has explored the issue. Also, since each BIT, MIT and investment 
contract in essence is self-contained; the formal interpretative starting point must in any 
case be itself, whereas parallels to other investment law awards, however strong, are factors 
whose importance is based on persuasiveness rather than precedence.
220
 Nevertheless, 
lacking any other formal interpretive articulations, persuasiveness seems better than 
nothing, whereupon it may be argued that similarly worded NPM clauses perhaps should 
be assumed to refer to similar standards of review, at least unless something entirely 
different may be inferred from other interpretive factors. 
Situating a further discussion of that problem on the sideline for the time being, and 
moving back into the standard “necessary for” terminology however, the questions still 
remains which standard of review to utilize in evaluating the nexus. The US-Xanadu BIT 
does, like most other BITs presently out there, not explicitly regulate this question. One 
central issue that thereby has to be faced is how the “necessary for”-term should be 
interpreted in this respect. Some alternatives, as will be indicated in section 5.1.2 below, 
exist, but the very first matter that needs to be clarified is whether the wording of an NPM 
clause does, and for that matter should, influence the standard of review evaluation at all.  
Despite the wording of article 31, first paragraph of the Vienna Convention, the 
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affirmation that the terminology of the nexus requirement may influence the standard of 
review to be utilized by anyone reviewing the requirement is perhaps somewhat less 
obvious than it initially would appear: As has already been noted, the standard of review is 
but the framework governing the juridical-analytical operation of balancing, while the 
nexus requirement is, in this case, the actual issue under review. To let the latter influence 
the former may thus seem a bit like a logical fallacy in that a factor of an equation always is 
logically separate from, and may thus not alter, the morphology the equation. Furthermore, 
to allow the object under review to affect the review process may lead to less legal 
predictability and consistency since it in such situations would be harder to discern one‟s 
legal position up front: Juridical terrain in which multiple, interlinked determinants modify 
and alter one and other is obviously harder to map out than topography dependant on but 
one factor. Nevertheless, the wording of the nexus requirement under scrutiny is usually the 
fixed point to where an analysis of which standard of review to be utilized is anchored, 
simply because no formally authoritative articulations are elsewhere found. Note in this 
respect also article 42 of the ICSID Convention which states that that „the tribunal shall 
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties‟. The 
nexus requirement is thus probably the closest the US-Xanadu ICSID tribunal may get to 
such a rule relating to which standard of review it is to utilize in that its wording may 
indicate the direction of the parties‟ intention(s). 
The latter topic is also closely tied to the issue of what authority the mentioned tribunal 
should exercise relative to the competence of the Xanadu to arrange its own internal affairs. 
This one was discussed in section 3.1.4 under the heading “intensity of review”. An 
investment tribunal arbitrating under a strict intensity of review would appear freer to 
utilize the standard of review of its own choice than would a more deferential tribunal. The 
former may thus heed the wording of the nexus requirement less than may the latter. Since 
however, as mentioned above, it does seem to be the case that neither ICSID tribunals nor 
any other of the international investment kind exercise any common intensity of review 
standard, the conclusion of the preceding paragraph appear to still hold sway in the 
aggregate: As no other common trend or fixed point exist, the wording of the nexus 
requirement does influence the standard of review, even though the particular intensity of 
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review in question to a certain degree may dictate the amplitude. Case law seems to 
implicitly affirm this statement.
221
 
Having thereby found that it in principle may influence the standard of review, the 
logical structure would at this point be to indicate the alternative interpretations that the 
nexus of article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT may be subject to. This will be done in section 
5.1.2 just below. One additional note is required before delving into such an analysis, 
however: Lacking a comprehensive body of international investment law NPM clause 
jurisprudence dealing with standards of review, and especially the proportionality standard, 
the following discussion will from time to time utilize arguments from WTO law. Though 
WTO law and international investment law formally are distinct juridical entities, their 
somewhat similar context and scope in terms of concerning the transfer of capital across 
national borderlines prompts a certain crossover of argumentation based on its causal 
persuasiveness. It should be stressed that such transfusion needs be tempered by the 
differences between the entities, however. In a preclusion of expropriation context for 
instance, a WTO NPM clause protects the state against the community while an investment 
law NPM clause protects it against a private party. Differing premises are thus at play. 
Pains must be taken to ensure that the implications of such nuances not are lost in the 
transfusion. 
 
5.1.2 The alternatives 
In theory, an unlimited number of possible ways to review the nexus are conceivable. 
In international law practice however, but four distinct alternatives have crystallized.
222
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These are “choice-constrained validity”, “self-defence-reliant necessity evaluation”, “least 
restrictive means analysis” and “proportionality”.223 Each will now be briefly dissected in 
turn. Afterwards, a few notes on some standard of review alternatives based on (US) 
municipal law are merited. 
Starting off with the “choice-constrained validity” standard, this one would appear to 
be, as shall be further discussed in section 5.2.1, the preferred standard for reviewing of the 
nexus requirement of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility article 25.
224
 The gist here 
is that “necessary for” is equated with a situation where the state measure under evaluation 
is the only available way to safeguard the interest in question.
225
 Choice-constrained 
validity thus transforms the nexus requirement into a rule (as opposed to a principle) since 
no balancing will be required: If other, otherwise lawful, measures conceivably were 
available, the measure in question was not necessary, if not, then it was.
226
 Under this 
interpretation it is doubtful whether Xanadu will be able to rely on its defence of necessity 
under article 18 of the BIT: Other possible measures to safeguard the environment were, 
albeit complex and costly, conceivable. It might for instance have been possible to create 
some sort of an immensely expensive underground water-purifying plant just downriver 
from the unobtanium mine. The choice-constrained validity standard will be further 
addressed in section 5.2.1. 
The second standard of review alternative, above dubbed “self-defence-reliant 
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necessity evaluation”, has crystallized out of ICJ case law on US treaties on Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation.
227
 Here, a self-defence requirement is imported into the 
definition of necessity. In the Oil Platforms case for instance, the ICJ held that „the 
question of whether the measures taken were “necessary” overlaps with the question of 
their validity as acts of self-defence‟228. The jurisprudence and results of the Oil Platforms 
and Nicaragua cases indicate that this standard of review is a strict one. In the case of 
Xanadu, the ban on unobtanium extraction evidently does not constitute an act of self-
defence, and would thus not be precluded by article 18 of the BIT if self-defence-reliant 
necessity evaluation was to be deemed the standard of review applicable. 
The third standard of review alternative, “least restrictive means analysis” (often 
otherwise termed “least restrictive alternative test”), is, in fact, at the outset a standard not 
very different from “proportionality”. In assessing the standard of review question under 
international investment law, some commentators nevertheless hold least restrictive means 
analysis to be inherently more suited than proportionality in terms of functionality within 
the peculiar sphere of this legal subject.
229
 The crucial distinction is that while 
proportionality encompasses a three-stage procedure ending up in a proportionality stricto 
sensu test,
230
 least restrictive means analysis places all emphasis on the first two of the 
stages, and especially on the necessity stage.
231
  As seen however, several tribunals have 
jumbled the necessity test together with the proportionality stricto sensu test into one 
combined analysis, not only prompting the question of which standard of review they 
actually are utilizing, but also blurring the conceptual borderline between proportionality 
and least restrictive means analysis in general. At the international level, especially some 
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WTO tribunals, whose standard of review still not is completely clarified,
232
 have been 
known to blur the mentioned borderline in cases like Korea – Various Measures on Beef.233  




Whether or not Xanadu would be able to defend its measure of indirect expropriation 
by relying on the NPM clause of article 18 under a nexus review based on least restrictive 
means analysis, is a somewhat open question: That the suitability stage of this analysis is 
fulfilled would appear to be fairly obvious since the ban on extraction definitely proved 
functional in stopping the pollution. The debatable issue however, is whether any other 
measure than the ban employed, achieving the same level of environmental protection but 
less restrictive on the RDA operation, could have been implemented instead (the necessity 
requirement). 
As did the Continental Casualty tribunal,
235
 the Xanadu tribunal could perhaps, as a 
starting point for the assessment of this question, take a look at the WTO Appellate Body 
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres award. This one states that „in 
order to determine whether a measure is "necessary" within the meaning of [the article in 
question], a panel must assess all the relevant factors, particularly the extent of the 
contribution to the achievement of a measure's objective [...], in the light of the importance 
of the interests or values at stake. If this analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the 
measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure with its 
possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent 
contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued‟236. The crucial point to be noted 
is that only measures contributing to the protection of the Xanaduian environment at least 
as much as did the ban on unobtanium extraction thus may be deemed alternative.
237
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Furthermore, any such measure must also be reasonably available to Xanadu. The range of 
possible alternatives has thereby been severely cropped, but are there any left? Obviously, 
the rinsing alternative presented under the choice-constrained validity standard is not viable 
since the river is flowing underground and that measure thereby would be too costly for 
Xanadu to be considered reasonable. Other scenarios could possibly be constructed, but to 
settle the matter in the context of this thesis, it may be assumed that all of them would be 
deemed unreasonable. The NPM clause of article 18 of the BIT would hence exclude 
Xanadu from liability under a standard of review based on least restrictive means analysis. 
The final standard of review alternative is “proportionality”.238 This standard has 
already been thoroughly reviewed above, and should therefore need no further introduction 
here. In the Xanadu case, the review of the first two stages of a proportionality analysis 
under article 18 of the BIT will mirror the one conducted under the least restrictive means 
analysis above. Finding that the ban on extraction of unobtanium probably could be 
deemed suitable and necessary is not the end of the story here, however. It must 
subsequently be assessed whether the ban (as a function of the environmental interests 
sought protected) was proportional, in the strict sense of the word, to the opposing norms, 
interests or values of the RDA thereby infringed. The Xanaduian government‟s interests in 
a continued protection of Xanadu‟s environment must, in other words, be balanced against 
the RDA‟s interests of protecting its investments. It may be that the latter interests hold so 
much relative weight that the ban on extraction of unobtanium, though suitable and 
necessary, not can be considered proportional.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Comparative Perspective chapter II part E section 2. 
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Looking to arbitration practice for inspiration in resolving this issue, it is evident that 
measures depriving the investors of substantial monetary value not were considered 
disproportional in relation to the possibility of Argentinean financial breakdown in the 
Continental Casualty award.
239
 Xanadu might be facing substantial environmental 
problems in the event of continued unobtanium extraction, while the RDA stands at the 
brink of financial collapse if the ban on extraction continues. Relative to the Continental 
Casualty case, the investor interests in favour of disproportionality are thus perhaps 
somewhat more pronounced in the Xanadu case. At the same time, environmental issues 
have been proved to carry substantial weight in cases such as Methanex v United States.
240
 
Since a continued unobtanium extraction would have severe effects on Xanadu‟s 
environment, it might therefore be assumed that the Xanaduian government‟s measures 
were proportional to the harm suffered by the RDA. Article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT 
would thus exclude Xanadu from liability also under a review based on the proportionality 
standard.   
The four standards of review now presented are, as seen, those usually relied upon 
when international tribunals need conduct a balancing of competing norms, interests and 
values. To complete the picture, however, a few remarks on the standards of review relied 
upon by US courts are merited: While most other countries of the western hemisphere have 
embraced proportionality as the applicable standard of review within their respective 
municipal law,
241
 US courts currently utilize a range of standards relative to which kinds of 
norms interests and values that are to be balanced against one another.
242
 This system is 
thus very much interlaced with the underlying structure of US jurisprudence, and in 
particular its constitutional law. As for the actual standards of review relied upon, the range 
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stretches from proportionality-like “strict scrutiny review”,243 through “intermediate 
scrutiny” which not is unlike least restrictive means analysis,244 to “rational basis testing” 
which resembles the suitability test of proportionality.
245
 Since both proportionality and 
least restrictive means analysis already have been discussed, the only really new standard 
of review alternative that US law thus might be said to present the Xanadu-tribunal with is 
rational basis testing.
246
 As it already have been shown that the ban on unobtanium 
extraction obviously is appropriate to achieve the objective pursued, Xanadu would 
evidently be excluded from liability by article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT also under a 
review based on this standard. 
 
5.1.3 So, which one is it? 
Having sketched out the alternative standards of review the tribunal might employ in 
evaluating whether the NPM clause of article 18 of the BIT may exclude Xanadu from 
liability; the question now is which one it should utilize. As was indicated in section 5.1.1 
above, the wording of the nexus requirement might here constitute something of a basis. 
The nexus of article 18 states that the measure in question must be “necessary for” the 
pursuit of the relevant aim. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention holds that „a treaty shall be 
interpreted [...] in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context‟. The wording of the nexus pulls the thoughts in the direction of least 
restrictive means analysis since this one emphasizes the necessity test, but that is not the 
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end of the story.  
The Vienna Convention article 31 namely also holds that a treaty shall be interpreted 
„in the light of its object and purpose‟. The purpose of a BIT is first and foremost 
investment protection.
247
 Thus the interpretation of the nexus conveying the strongest 
protection to the RDA right of extraction might be given preference. Of the alternatives 
listed above, choice constrained validity clearly holds this position since it, as seen, more or 
less always would exempt preclusion of liability. Note furthermore that between least 
restrictive means analysis and proportionality, the latter necessarily will provide the 
stronger protection.
248
 However, presumptions about interpretations of NPM clauses based 
on objects and purposes „should be used with caution since they provide ready-made 
generalized rule[s] that may not fit in a particular case or be faithful to the intentions of 
treaty partners‟249. Also, such presumptions may often be counteracted by other 
presumptions, for instance the preposition that treaty obligations, as derogations of 
sovereignty, should be subject to a restrictive interpretation.
250
 The weight of the 
presumption-argument in favour of choice constrained validity should for these reasons not 
be exaggerated.  
Another interpretive factor to be taken into account is arbitration practice.
251
 A 
common consensus relating to the applicable standard of review within an international 
investment law NPM clause context has yet to crystallize, however. As for the latest 
decision relating to an NPM clause of “necessary for”-terminology, Continental Casualty, 
it would seem to lean towards the proportionality standard.
252
 That tribunal‟s application of 
proportionality is not entirely clean though, as it includes in the necessity test a question of 
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„whether [Argentina] could have adopted at some earlier time different policies that would 
have avoided or prevented the situation that brought about the adoption of the measures 
challenged‟253. The proportionality standard in comparison, as developed above in chapter 
3, limits the necessity test to alternative measures that might have been available at the time 
the measure in question was initiated. In fact, to suggest that a state needs to dispose itself 
of a problem before it has ever occurred would seem a bit like a logical fallacy in terms of 
causality. Even so, the standard of review applied by the Continental Casualty tribunal 
definitely lies closer to proportionality than to any of the other alternatives outlined in 
section 5.1.2, regardless of whether it applied one of the tests therein in an odd manner. If 
the Xanadu tribunal was to place decisive weight on the persuasiveness of the most recent 
jurisprudence, proportionality would thus be the applicable alternative. Note that an 
annulment decision on the Continental Casualty case currently is pending. 
Three earlier awards assume an entirely different position than does Continental 
Casualty by equating the standard of review under a BIT provision using “necessary for”-
terminology with the standard of review under the customary necessity defence of article 
25 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and finding the latter to be the choice 
constrained validity.
254
 The awards are CMS v Argentina
255





. The Sempra award was subsequently annulled for this explicit 
reason.
258
 As for the CMS and Enron awards, both of these have also been annulled (only 
partly in CMS‟ case), but on other grounds than wrong standard of review application under 
their BIT NPM clause evaluations. Nevertheless, the annulment committee did, in the CMS 
v Argentina: Decision on Annulment, severely criticize the CMS award for equating the 
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NPM clause of the BIT in question with article 25 of the Draft Articles.
259
 In the Enron v 
Argentina: Decision on Annulment, the annulment committee annulled the initial award on 
the ground that the standard of review utilized under the scrutiny of article 25 of the Draft 
Articles was tainted with error,
260
 but refused to consider whether the initial award had 
erred with respect to equating it with the nexus requirement of the NPM clause of the US-
Argentina BIT.
261
 In sum, the three awards, as a consequence of they subsequently being 
annulled, would seem to constitute a tendency against the prospect of utilizing choice 
constrained validity as the preferred standard of review, especially on the basis that article 
18 of the BIT should be equated with article 25 of the Draft Articles.
262
 The cited 
paragraphs of the CMS and Sempra annulment decisions would explicitly seem to affirm 
this assertion. 
In addition to the Continental Casualty, CMS, Enron and Sempra decisions, one more 
award tackling an Argentine NPM clause defence presently exists: In LG&E v Argentina, 
the NPM clause in question was found to exempt Argentina from liability without the 
tribunal conducting very much of an explicit review of the nexus requirement at all.
263
 
Some lip service was paid to it in noting that no other alternative means were available to 
Argentina,
264
 but it is impossible to say whether the tribunal utilized choice constrained 
validity, least restrictive means analysis or some entirely different standard of review to 
reach this result.
265
 The award is thus not very helpful to the Xanadu-tribunal in its analysis 
of which standard of review to apply. It is worth noting that an Appellate Body decision on 
the LG&E case currently is pending. 
Having now outlined the principle starting points of interpretation, the aim is for the 
Xanadu-tribunal to dissect each of the four alternative standards of review indicated in 
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section 5.1.2 in turn, and thus, ideally, find which one currently commands the most 
prominent juridical support. The US standard of review approach will not be reviewed 
since it, as mentioned, is very much interlaced with the underlying structure of US 
jurisprudence, and therefore may be considered of limited applicability in juridical 
circumstances not based on US law. 
Starting off, for structural reasons, with “self-defence-reliant necessity evaluation”, 
this interpretation alternative seems to fit poorly with the context, object and purpose of 
article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT: While the scope of most international investment law 
NPM clauses is polyphased in covering a multitude of circumstances,
266
 the context in 
which the self-defence-reliant necessity evaluation so far has been utilized only concerns 
self defence in the narrow sense.
267
 This is not to say that this standard of review is 
fundamentally inapplicable within international investment law boundaries, but rather that 
both the interpretive factors emphasized by article 31 of the Vienna Convention and the 
arbitration practice cited above depreciate this alternative relative to the other options. It is 
thus unlikely that the Xanadu-tribunal would choose self-defence-reliant necessity 
evaluation as the standard of review to be utilized. 
A somewhat more probable possibility is “choice constrained validity”. In WTO law, a 
much quoted citation of Appellate Body jurisprudence has been that „the term "necessary" 
refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies 
"necessary" understood as "indispensable"; at the other end, is "necessary" taken to mean 
as "making a contribution to"‟268. Under such a terminology, the choice constrained validity 
standard would equate “necessary” with “indispensable”, and, as seen, transform the 
standard of review concept from a principle into a rule. Since, however, the actual wording 
of article 18 of the BIT is “necessary for” rather than “indispensible for”, an interpretation 
of the NPM clause favouring choice constrained validity would initially appear somewhat 
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inconsistent when viewed in the light of article 31 first paragraph of the Vienna Convention 
which states that „a treaty shall be interpreted [...] in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty‟: The ordinary meaning of “necessary for” is 
definitely not only “indispensible for”. 
On the other hand, it may and have been argued that the NPM clauses of the US BIT 
program (of which it can be assumed that the US-Xanadu BIT is a part) were drafted with 
the intention of being but a cross-reference to the customary international law defence of 
necessity as codified by article 25 of the Draft Articles of State Responsibility.
269
 Since the 
intent of the parties is listed as an interpretive factor in the Vienna Convention article 31, 
this argument may favour equating the interpretation of “necessary for” in article 18 of the 
US-Xanadu BIT with the interpretation of the nexus requirement in article 25 of the Draft 
Articles. The latter, as shall be further explored in section 5.2.1, prescribes choice 
constrained validity as the applicable standard of review. Choice constrained validity has 
also been favoured by commentators emphasizing that all BIT articles should be interpreted 
in the direction of investment protection as the fundamental object and purpose of 
investment treaties.
270
 This standard of review is namely the alternative that offers the best 
investment protection in that it limits state preclusion the most.
271
 
Note, however, that equating article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT with article 25 of the 
Draft Articles in principle is a different concept than interpreting the necessity terminology 
under both articles to accommodate the same standard of review. The initial argument of 
the preceding paragraph may thus, at best, be deemed circumstantial.
272
 Furthermore, it has 
already been shown that ICSID tribunals actually are disinclined to equate the articles, a 
disposition further weakening the cited circumstantial evidence. As for the object-and-
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purpose-argument, it is limited by the factors already explored in section 5.1.1, especially 
by possible opposing interpretive principles and alternative purposes. While it is correct 
that the object and purpose of the BIT is investment protection, the object and purpose of 
the NPM clause in isolation is to provide Xanadu with leeway in exceptional 
circumstances. To read into it a standard which would essentially truncate it under almost 
all thinkable scenarios would thus seem to, though following the object and purpose of the 
BIT, go against the object and purpose of the NPM clause itself. 
In sum, taking especially account of the wording of article 18 as well as the ICSID 
annulment decisions on the Sempra, CMS and Enron cases, settling on choice constrained 
validity as the applicable standard of review would seem an unlikely choice for the tribunal 
of the RDA-Xanadu arbitration. Do mind that only the issue of which standard of review to 
utilize under article 18 thereby has been somewhat delimited. The issue of equating, in 
general, article 18 with article 25 of the Draft Articles will be sought further illuminated in 
section 5.3 below. 
The third possible standard of review is “least restrictive means analysis”. As 
mentioned, this alternative might be the one best in tune with the wording of article 18. On 
the other hand, this one is also the alternative most lenient on host state legislative latitude 
and thereby least in tune with investment protection as the object and purpose of the 
BIT.
273
 No arbitration tribunals have to date directly favoured least restrictive means 
analysis as the preferred NPM clause standard of review, but it has been cited as such in 
some WTO law jurisprudence.
274
 The latter is currently somewhat inconsistent at the 
aggregate level as to which standard of review that is to be preferred, though.
275
  
This lack of indicative case law coupled with a somewhat ambivalent interpretive 
foundation equates into situation under which the merits of least restrictive means analysis 
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are difficult to assess. That investment tribunals so far have been unwilling to utilize its 
prospects, however, might in itself constitute an argument against its utility. Furthermore, 
though it might be partly offset by other factors, the object and purpose of the US-Xanadu 
BIT in terms of investment protection might disfavour least restrictive means analysis 
relative to the other, stricter, standard of review alternatives: As the standard most lenient 
on state sovereignty, least restrictive means analysis might appear less appealing to an 
ICSID tribunal concerned with taking more than a minimum of account of such object and 
purpose argumentation.
276
 Relying on indistinct and fragmentary practice from WTO law 
would appear as too weak a basis for the Xanadu-tribunal to adopt in order to offset these 
considerations, at least unless it decided to grant decisive weight to the wording of article 
18. In sum, least restrictive means analysis is thus a possible, but perhaps slightly awkward 
standard of review alternative for the tribunal to choose. 
The final interpretive possibility is “proportionality”. Again, the wording of article 18 
of the US-Xanadu BIT does disfavour this one somewhat relative to least restrictive means 
analysis since “necessary for” would seem to highlight the necessity test alone: Unlike the 
least restrictive means analysis, the proportionality standard takes a step beyond necessity 
in adding a proportionality stricto sensu test. Relative to the choice constrained validity 
standard, however, proportionality would seem to be the one favoured by the wording of 
the BIT: While the former equates “necessary for” with “indispensible for” (thereby 
turning article 18 into a rule), the latter does not push the standard that far from its 
terminological basis. In terms of the continuum of the Korea – Various Measures on Beef 
WTO award, proportionality would thus situate the standard of review closer to the pole of 
indispensable than least restrictive means analysis, but not on the top of that pole as does 
choice constrained validity. It might therefore be viewed as sort of a middle ground 
standard in terms of wording.  
As for object and purpose of the BIT, the proportionality standard takes more account 
of investment protection than least restrictive means analysis: While not as stringent as 
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choice constrained validity, it poses an additional test for any government measure to 
transverse before the state is precluded from liability on account of it. In that sense, it might 
appeal to a tribunal trying to conjure up an award which weights in the arguments of both 
parties to the dispute since it thus is situated on middle ground also in terms of strictness.
277
 
The current case law situation would also seem to favour proportionality. As it turns 
out, one of the two only (presently) unannulled arbitration awards dealing with investment 
law NPM clauses is Continental Casualty,
278
 and this one would seem to rely on the 
proportionality standard.
279
 More spe cifically, paragraphs 196-197 deals with the 
suitability test, paragraphs 198-230 with the necessity test and paragraphs 231-233 with the 
proportionality stricto sensu test. As mentioned above, the analysis under the necessity test 
is a bit off in relation to the standard established in section 3.1.2, but this does not 
intrinsically cause the persuasiveness of the award in terms of endorsing the proportionality 
framework as such to waver too much: The tribunal still works its way through the 
cumulative steps in paragraphs 196-233, and still refers to its own analysis as 
proportionality in paragraph 227. It might at this point also be prudent to adduce that the 
tribunal, in paragraphs 234-236, would seem to denounce the standard of review utilized in 
evaluating article 25 of the Draft Articles (which is, as shall be seen below, choice 
constrained validity) as an applicable alternative. 
In conclusion, the proportionality standard would thus seem to have a lot going for it in 
terms of being situated in between least restrictive means analysis and choice constrained 
validity both on a strictness scale relating to preclusion of liability, and in relation to 
wording: It takes somewhat more account of the investment protection argument than does 
the former at the same time as it is more in accordance with the wording of article 18 than 
the latter. Furthermore, it is supported by the present case law situation, this one albeit 
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somewhat on the slim side (most awards having been annulled). In total, the proportionality 
standard is not an unlikely choice for the US-Xanadu tribunal to end up preferring. 
As for differently worded NPM clauses, a concrete evaluation will probably have to be 
undertaken in each distinct case. Had article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT read “indispensable 
for” instead of “necessary for” for instance, the above argumentation relating to article 31 
first alternative of the Vienna Convention would have favoured choice constrained validity, 
in turn possibly affecting the tribunal‟s choice of standard of review approach. Other 
examples of differently worded NPM clauses include “directed to”280, “required to”281, “for 
the reasons of”282 and “in the interest of”283 just to name a few. The wording of the NPM 
clause in question is, as seen, but one factor among several taken into account when 
determining the proper standard of review, however. Its practical merits must therefore be 
balanced against the other factors highlighted by article 31 of the Vienna Convention in 
each distinct case of evaluation. 
 
5.1.4 Proportionality’s potential 
Though its potential not can be said to entirely tip the issue, the proportionality 
standard does, as explored in the second to last paragraph of section 5.1.3, perhaps possess 
a certain aptitude as a favoured instrument on which to hinge the nexus of an NPM clause 
balancing operation: If it is assumed that the alternatives presented in section 5.1.2 are 
exhaustive,
284
 proportionality would seem to be situated on middle ground along several 
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axes. Middle ground may, in turn, be the preferred field of operation for tribunals whose 
work entails equating strong opposing positions. Thus, the proportionality standard might 
appear appealing relative to the alternatives. 
Relative to choice constrained validity on the one side, proportionality sets a less 
stringent standard in terms of precluding liability. While the former demands that no other 
alternatives present themselves under the necessity test, the latter states that precluding 
liability initially only requires a lack of less restrictive alternatives. Proportionality 
furthermore demands, though, that a proportionality stricto sensu analysis subsequently is 
conducted. In theory, a situation under which a measure that was deemed precluded by the 
choice constrained validity standard and, as a result, also by the necessity stage of the 
proportionality standard, is considered disproportional under the proportionality stricto 
sensu analysis is thus imaginable. In such a case, the proportionality standard would be the 
stricter alternative. In terms of the Xanadu arbitration, this would be the situation if it was 
found that Xanadu simply had no other options than banning unobtanium extraction, at the 
same time as the positive, environmental effects of that measure was deemed 
disproportional to the negative effects of making the RDA extraction rights virtually 
valueless. However, such a situation, where there simply exists no host state decision 
latitude at all, does appear more or less unimaginable.
285
 As long as that is the case, the 
relative difference of the strictness of the necessity tests dictates the relative strictness of 
the two standards of review as such, and choice-constrained validity does, as seen, sport the 
strictest test by equating “necessary for” with “indispensible for”. 
If the nexus of article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT was deemed to reflect the choice 
constrained validity standard, article 18 would therefore become more or less valueless as a 
NPM clause since its criteria almost never could get satisfied. Though such a thing 
definitely would strengthen investor rights, it would also face two opposing sentiments 
based on the object and purpose of the BIT: First, it would, as seen, go against the 
supposition that treaty obligations, as derogations of sovereignty, should be subject to a 
                                                                                                                                                    
thus seem to lead to a more theoretical discussion than the one conceptualized by this thesis. 
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 If the costs (in the widest sense of the word) of the alternatives are disregarded, any situation will 




 Second, it would confront the position that all treaty articles 
should be interpreted in a way that at least would give them a minuscule of effect.
287
 What 
would otherwise be the point of including them in the first place? This argument further 
connects with the presumption that the interpretation of treaties should be based on the 
intent(s) of the parties.
288
 Taking these assertions into account disfavours choice 
constrained validity as the preferred standard of review. Proportionality being the closest 
option to it in terms of strictness, it is the logical alternative for a tribunal placing 
emphasise on the object and purpose of the BIT in terms of investment protection to turn to 
next. 
Relative to least restrictive means analysis on the other side, the proportionality 
standard adds an additional obstacle for the state measure to face in the form of the 
proportionality stricto sensu test. Given that the first two stages of proportionality analysis 
are wholly equated with the two stages under least restrictive means analysis,
289
 this would 
mean that proportionality is the stricter standard in terms of preclusion of liability, and 
therefore conveys tighter investment protection regulation.  
In total, being less strict than choice constrained validity, but more than least restrictive 
means analysis, proportionality operates on middle ground in terms of strictness. As 
already seen, it is also a happy medium in terms of how literally close it is to the ordinary 
                                                 
286
 See SGS v Pakistan paragraph 171. 
287
 See Noble Ventures Inc. v Romania paragraph 50, as well as Newcombe, A. and Paradell, L., Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties chapter 2 part VII § 2.29 page 114. 
288
 See the Vienna Convention article 31 paragraph 4. 
289
 In light of the argumentation presented in sections 3.1.2 and 5.1.2, this would implicitly seem to be 
assumed. However, it is not unthinkable that different tribunals may utilize least restrictive means analysis 
and the first two stages of the proportionality analysis differently and thereby effectuate a discrepancy. Since 
there in international investment law yet have been no cases where the tribunal has resorted to least restrictive 
means analysis, a comparison hereunder is currently impossible. As for WTO law, it would seem that the 
standards of review utilized very much glide over in each other; from proportionality to some intermediate 
hybrid to least restrictive means analysis. See Kapterian, G., A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on 
‘Necessity’ part 2 section C page 100. This would imply that, though not totally overlapping, least restrictive 
means analysis and the first two steps of proportionality analysis at least are considered quite close in terms of 
functionality. 
78 
meaning given to the “necessary for” wording (least restrictive means analysis being more 
in tune with it, while choice constrained validity being less so). Furthermore, 
proportionality incorporates an additional aspect into any balancing operation based on its 
framework than does the other alternatives (including self-defence-reliant necessity 
evaluation and rational basis testing for that matter): While they in principle only evaluate 
the measure in question against alternative measures, the proportionality standard, through 
its proportionality stricto sensu test, additionally equates it against the norms, interests and 
values asserted by the opposing party. Without striding too far into an intensity of review 
analysis, the crucial point to be noted is that it thereby may function as a steam valve 
against possibly adverse arbitrational results. 
Imagine for instance the least restrictive alternative test being preferred by the Xanadu-
tribunal, and that the ban on extraction thereby was considered necessary thus precluding 
Xanadu from liability. Imagine furthermore that this would obviously lead to RDA 
bankruptcy, at the same time as the positive effects on the Xanaduian environment actually 
would be minuscule in comparison. It may be argued that such a result would be 
inequitable and therefore defeat the fundamental purpose of balancing. If the tribunal had 
evaluated the NPM clause nexus under the proportionality standard on the other hand, it 
would have had the possibility to reject Xanadu‟s argumentation on account of the relative 
disparity between the costs and the effects of the ban, and thus fashion an equitable award. 
That such an option from time to time is valuable to possess is exemplified by WTO 
law practice. As seen, the Appellate Body has, in cases where it initially would appear to 
prefer least restrictive means analysis, tried to mix elements of the proportionality stricto 
sensu test into the necessity test.
290
 A much more lucid approach would have been to 
formally embrace proportionality as the optimal standard of review, based on the argument 
that this would further predictability and consistency within the relevant body of law. 
In conclusion, proportionality‟s potential lies both in its position as the middle ground 
standard of review alternative, and in its capacity to formally encompass a broader range of 
considerations than the other standards of review and thereby minimize the possibility of 
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 Its potential might be considered concretized by its 
diffusion.
292
 Note, though, that some commentators argue against this position by asserting 
that arbitration tribunals not are inherently equipped to conduct proportionality stricto 
sensu reviews at all,
293
 because such questions concern empirical and value-laden 
judgements best conducted by the state party as the authority on the local affairs of its 
nation.
294
 This should be properly identified as an issue of intensity of review rather than 
standard of review however, and is functionally therefore a separate topic from the one this 




5.2 The customary necessity defence 
In a manner similar to the one it asserts under article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT, 
Xanadu claims that the customary international law defence of necessity precludes it from 
any liability otherwise procured by the ban on unobtanium extraction. There would seem to 
be a general consensus among commentators and practitioners that this necessity defence is 
articulated by article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.
296
 As already stated, it is assumed that apart from the nexus 
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requirement, Xanadu fulfils all the other criteria that article 25 sets. The question of 
preclusion thus (again) hinges on the nexus. 
 
5.2.1 The standard of review applicable 
The nexus of article 25 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility has a quite 
different wording than did article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT. While the latter states that the 
measure in question needs to be “necessary for” safeguarding the aim pursued, the former 
holds that the measure must be “the only way for the state to safeguard” that aim. This 
fairly strong articulation points, interpreted in the light of article 31 first paragraph of the 
Vienna Convention, towards a very strict standard of review in more or less explicitly 
stating the central tenet of the choice constrained validity standard. Such an interpretation 
is also supported by the ILC commentaries on the article,
297
 which may be viewed as 
preparatory work in accordance with article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
Taking into account case law within the international investment field, this picture 
recently turned slightly blurry though: While both the original CMS, Enron and Sempra 
awards would seem to endorse choice constrained validity as the preferred standard of 
review under article 25 of the Draft Articles,
298
 their annulment decisions not only dampen 
their impact, but also, in Enron‟s case, seem to open for the possibility that other standards 
of review could be applicable to the nexus of article 25.
299
 As for the Continental Casualty 
and the Vivendi II: Decision on Annulment awards, neither directly discusses the issue, but 
it would appear that they both implicitly assume the article 25 nexus standard to be quite 
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In other words: there is a fairly strong terminological and factual basis for concluding 
that the standard of review under article 25 of the Draft Articles is choice constrained 
validity. However, the recent annulment decision on the Enron case is causing some chaos 
since it would seem to annul the Enron award on the basis that it applied article 25 wrongly 
in not explicitly assessing whether choice-constrained validity actually was the correct 
standard of review to be utilized.
301
 It furthermore seems open to the possibility that, 
despite its wording, article 25 should take into account reasonableness, thereby pushing the 
underlying standard of review away from choice constrained validity and towards least 
restrictive means analysis or something similar.
302
 Note though, that the Annulment 
Committee limits itself to pointing out these possible adverse interpretations, and does not 
directly state that it favours one over the others.
303
 The antagonistic effect of the award 
should for that reason not be overstated. 
Since the necessity defence of article 25 of the Draft Articles is based on customary 
international law, its content is not solely reliant on international investment law practice 
however. In fact, its customary character makes it subject to case law and authoritative 
argumentation from all fields of international law. To pinpoint the proper standard of 
review applicable, it is therefore necessary to broaden the horizon. Looking to ICJ practice, 
the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case would seem to be the operative decision.
304
 The 
court here applies a fairly strict standard to its nexus assessment,
305
 and it proceeds along 
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the same line in the Construction of a Wall case.
306
 In sum, the ICJ practice would thus 
seem to support choice constrained validity as the standard of review applicable to the 
nexus of the necessity defence articulated in article 25 of the Draft Articles. 
For the Xanadu-tribunal to conclude that choice constrained validity not is the 
preferred standard of review alternative to be utilized in evaluating the nexus of the 
customary necessity defence would subsequently be problematic. The Enron v Argentina: 
Decision on Annulment opens for the possibility, but in the face of argumentation based on 
the terminology of article 25, preparatory work and several tribunal awards over multiple 
juridical fields, that decision‟s somewhat inconclusive statements probably mount too weak 
an opposition. As it has already been shown that there were alternatives available to 
Xanadu other than banning the extraction of unobtanium outright, the criteria of article 25 
of the Draft Articles are not fulfilled and the country may therefore not rely on the 
customary necessity defence to preclude itself from liability. 
 
5.2.2 Proportionality’s potential 
Proportionality would not seem to attain much of a potential as the preferred standard 
of review to be utilized in evaluating the nexus of article 25 of the Draft Articles of State 
Responsibility under the conditions sketched out above. Its only hope may hinge on the 
articulations of the Enron annulment decision. It is there stated that „another possible 
interpretation [than choice constrained validity] would be that there must be no alternative 
measure that the State might have taken for safeguarding the essential interest in question 
that did not involve a similar or graver breach of international law. [...] Under this 
interpretation, the principle of necessity will only be precluded if there is an alternative that 
would not involve a breach of international law or which would involve a less grave breach 
of international law‟307. In other words, any alternative measures must be reasonable 
relative to how much they infer on the State‟s international duties. Furthermore, the 
decision also questions „whether the relative effectiveness of alternative measures is to be 
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taken into account‟308. If so, it may be argued that “the only way” only refers to measures 
of similar relative effectiveness, in turn meaning that the standard of review has drifted 
away from the rule-based alternative of choice constrained validity and towards a more 
principle-based standard in terms of least restrictive means analysis or proportionality. 
By in this way being detached from the pole of indispensability on the continuum of 
the Korea – Various Measures on Beef case, the nexus of article 25 would be made subject 
to the host of considerations indicated in section 5.1.4 since it thereby attains the more 
mellow properties of a juridical principle at the expense of the stringency of a rule. Both 
proportionality‟s position as a middle ground standard and its potential as steam valve 
against adverse arbitrational results would thus favour its utility.
309
 Again though, it is 
worth stressing that the current legal setting does not appear ready to deduct the nexus of 
article 25 from choice constrained validity as its functional standard of review, in spite of 
the articulations of Enron annulment decision. Proportionality‟s potential in this respect is 
therefore currently a fairly hypothetical quantity.  
 
5.3 Some notes on conflation 
A slight digression from the main topic of exploring the merits of proportionality 
within international investment law is at this point warranted. As has already been 
indicated, the original CMS, Sempra and Enron awards all equated the NPM clause of the 
US-Argentina BIT with the customary defence of necessity as articulated by article 25 of 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
310
 The latter two awards were subsequently 
annulled (and the Annulment Committee also severely criticized the approach of the CMS 
tribunal without actually annulling its decision on those merits), but the prospect they 
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fronted have been endorsed by some commentators.
311
 A few remarks on this issue are 
therefore merited since it may influence the potential utility of the proportionality standard 
indirectly by altering the operational premises it is subject to. 
 
5.3.1 The argument 
„The debate is essentially over whether [the NPM clause in question] means to displace 
relevant customary international law or, in more formal terms, is meant to be lex 
specialis‟312. It is argued that any NPM clause, according to the first paragraph of article 31 
of the Vienna Convention, should be interpreted in light of its object and purpose, and that 
the object and purpose of the NPM clauses within the context of the US BIT program is (or 
was) to simply refer to the customary necessity defence of the Draft Articles.
313
 Thereby, 




Furthermore, the argument goes that in accordance with the Vienna Convention article 
31 third paragraph alternative C, the interpretation of an NPM clause needs to take into 
account any relevant rule of international law. The customary necessity defence being close 
in terms of functionality to article 18 of the BIT, a tribunal interpreting the latter must 
therefore necessarily include the former in its assessment. „Moreover, the defence of 
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necessity is surly one of those fundamental rules of international law, such as exhaustion of 
local remedies, that requires very specific evidence of derogation‟315. Also, the object and 
purpose of the BIT in terms of investment protection is in this respect being flaunted.
316
 
Finally, analogies are drawn from the ICJ Oil Platforms case, in which it was articulated 
that „the application of the relevant rules of international law relating to this question [of 
preclusion of liability] thus forms an integral part of the task of interpretation [of the 
relevant treaty NPM clause]‟317. 
In total, though their actual assertions necessarily are a bit more sophisticated than the 
brief outline now traced, the commentators endorsing conflation would generally seem to 
agree with the CMS, Sempra and Enron tribunals in holding that the US-Argentina BIT 
NPM clause not was intended to and did not „deal with the legal elements necessary for the 
legitimate invocation of a state of necessity‟318. A discussion on the (lack of) self-judging 
character of BIT NPM provisions is also incorporated into this argumentation, thereby 
mixing the question of standard of review with a question of intensity of review.
319
 In sum, 
the postulate appears to be that article IX of the US-Argentina BIT functioned simply as a 
placeholder for, and reference to, the necessity defence of customary law. In other words, 
„the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals interpreted the “only means” requirement under 
article 25 [of the Draft Articles] as fatal to the necessity plea under article XI [of the BIT], 
if any other means were available to Argentina‟320. Such an understanding is positively 
based on the alleged intentions of the US BIT program, and negatively based on a 
truncation of any evidence to the opposite effect (for instance terminological asymmetry). 
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5.3.2 Critique and recent practice 
Starting off with the wording of the NPM provisions under scrutiny relative to the 
wording of article 25 of the Draft Articles, a natural conflation would not seem to be the 
most obvious of interpretative possibilities: Not only does article 25 operate in the opposite 
polarity of the BIT NPM provisions,
321
 but it also articulates the nexus differently. While 
the former holds that the measure in question must be “the only way to safeguard” the 
objective pursued, the latter only requires it to be “necessary for” safeguarding that aim. As 
was indicated in sections 5.1 and 5.2, this difference in wording favours different standards 
of review as the applicable one. The terminological asymmetry between the customary 
necessity defence and the BIT provisions thus constitutes an argument against conflation. 
Looking secondly to the object and purpose of the BIT NPM provisions; the supporters 
of conflation seem to rely heavily on the assertion that (despite its wording) the drafters of 
the US-Argentina BIT intended article IX simply to refer to the customary necessity 
defence.
322
 This argument is further supported by way of allusion to the alleged object and 
purpose of any BIT in providing investment protection.
323
 That these assertions carry some 
weight is indisputable. However, some additional details need to be acknowledged before 
any definite conclusions as to their aptitude may be drawn: First, it has already been shown 
that there are BIT objects and purposes which, if not totally negate the investment 
protection argument, at least moderate its character.
324
 Second, it does seem slightly odd 
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that the BIT drafters not only found it prudent to include an unnecessary provision in the 
sense that it‟s content but referred to a rule of customary law, but also that they included 
the clause despite that it would obviously be truncated under more or less any thinkable 
scenario since it was to be subject to the choice constrained validity standard of review.
325
 
Third, while it may be true that the purpose of the US with respect to article IX of the US-
Argentina BIT (and in extension article 18 of the US-Xanadu BIT) was conflation,
326
 
Argentina (and Xanadu) may have been differently disposed. Indeed, the only evidence to 
the contrary advances by commentators endorsing conflation is that Argentina was aware 
of the history behind the US BIT program.
327
 However, some level of awareness of the 
historical trends of US BITs does not necessarily equate into an intention of conformity 
with those trends, especially in light of the above-mentioned truncational consequence. In 
sum, though there might be said to exist a certain argumentative basis relating to an 
interpretation based on their object and purpose for equating US BIT NPM clauses with the 
customary necessity defence, it is doubtfully totally peremptory. 
Turning thirdly to case law, recent developments would seem to further weaken the 
argument for conflation. Where previously both the CMS, Sempra and Enron awards 
seemed to endorse its prospects, their subsequent annulment decisions not only negate their 
impact, but would even appear to reverse the tide. The CMS v Argentina: Decision on 
Annulment and the Enron v Argentina: Decision on Annulment does notably not annul the 
principal awards on the basis of conflation, however. The latter does in fact refuse to 
consider the problem at all,
328
 and rather annuls on another basis.
329
 The CMS annulment 
committee also refuses to annul on the basis of conflation,
330
 but does discuss matter. In 
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stating that „[the article XI of the US-Argentina BIT and article 25 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility] have a different operation and content‟331, that „the excuse based on 
customary international law [can] only be subsidiary to the exclusion based on article 
XI‟332 and that „article XI and article 25 [...] cover the same field and the tribunal should 
have applied article XI as the lex specialis governing the matter and not article 25‟333, the 
committee definitely made a case against conflation, albeit in dicta. 
As for the Sempra v Argentina: Decision on Annulment award, this one annuls on the 
grounds of conflation.
334
 In its own words: „it is apparent from this comparison [between 
article XI of the BIT and article 25 of the Draft Articles] that article 25 does not offer a 
guide to interpretation of the terms used in article XI. The most that can be said is that 
certain words or expressions are the same or similar‟335. Furthermore, „article 25 and article 
XI [...] deal with quite different situations‟336. Through its fairly detailed analysis of the 
matter from paragraph 197 to paragraph 208, the committee would in general seem to 
refuse that there are any grounds for conflating the two articles at all.  
To complete the tour of recent practice it should perhaps finally be noted that the 
Vivendi II: Decision on Annulment award not remarks upon the matter of conflation, even 
though it does concern itself with a defence of necessity. Instead it states that „both 
[parties] agree that the current state of the law on the defence of necessity is reflected in 
article 25 of the International Law Commission‟s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts‟337. It would thus appear that Argentina for some 
reason chose to base its case on the customary necessity defence alone in Vivendi II, 
disregarding the possibility of the US-Argentina BIT NPM clause. Thereby, scant guidance 
as to the relationship between the necessity defence of the Draft Articles and the defence 
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based on a BIT NPM provision may be inferred from this award. 
In conclusion, recent annulment practice, together with the asymmetry in wording 
would seem to block any conflation of BIT NPM clauses and the customary defence of 
necessity as articulated by article 25 of the Draft Articles. Though it may be that the object 
and purpose of BITs under the US BIT program to a certain extent support such equation, 
especially the assertions of the Sempra annulment decision are too unequivocal to 
overlook. Thereby, the Xanadu-tribunal may be considered banned from conflating article 
18 of the US-Xanadu BIT with the customary necessity rule of article 25 of the Draft 
Articles. 
 
5.4 The fair and equitable treatment standard 
The RDA claims that Xanadu is liable to pay compensation since it breached the fair 
and equitable treatment standard laid down in article 5 of the US-Xanadu BIT by banning 
all unobtanium extraction. Xanadu contests the assertion on the grounds that the mentioned 
standard should be interpreted in the context of the situation, and thus not may be 
considered breached. The tribunal must thus determine whether Xanadu awarded the RDA 
fair and equitable treatment. If the latter is deemed relative to any Xanaduian norms, 
interests and values, it will be faced with a balancing situation that in turn might beget 
proportionality. 
 
5.4.1 A balancing standard 
The fair and equitable treatment standard is a fairly flexible concept insulating the 
investor and his investment against adverse state behaviour.
338
 It is essentially intended to 
fill gaps that may be left by more specific standards of investment protection.
339
 A lot of 
ink has been spent on trying to clarify the concept‟s relation to international customary 
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 pin down its content and to map out its borderlines and topography. The intent of 
this section is not to explore and embellish on such theory, but rather to inspect the merits 
of proportionality within the context of the fair and equitable treatment standard. A few 
initial, theoretical remarks on the standard are warranted to properly identify the scope of 
this discussion, but a reader seeking a comprehensive review of the concept should look 
elsewhere.
341
 The main question sought answered here is instead whether the concept of 
fair and equitable treatment essentially involves balancing. 
Fair and equitable treatment is basically a fairly vague term.
342
 Its wording indicates 
that Xanadu is bound to treat the RDA and its investment at, or better than at, a certain 
threshold treatment level along a range of axes including vigilance and protection, due 
process and non-denial of justice, lack of arbitrariness and non-discrimination, and 
transparency and stability (hereunder respecting the investor‟s reasonable expectations).343 
The discussion thereby usually turns towards the tangible content of the standard by way of 
case law and theoretical constructions. However, detailed knowledge of what constitutes 
fair and equitable treatment in the abstract is not required to evaluate proportionality‟s 
potential relative to the tribunal‟s process of assessment of whether the fair and equitable 
treatment standard was breached. The crucial question instead to focus upon is whether the 
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environmental interests of Xanadu may be taken into account in the assessment. 
If the fair and equitable treatment standard is considered relative to such norms, 
interests and values of the host state, a tribunal reviewing the standard will in practice find 
itself confronted with a balancing situation: On the one side stands the (possibly) adverse 
treatment of the investor; while on the other stands the state‟s (possibly) justified 
motivation for treating the investor that way. Proportionality may enter the equation here as 
the method utilized in the process of equating the opposing positions.  
There are mixed views as to whether a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard should be considered relative to opposing norms, interests and values, however. 
While some commentators endorse the sentiment,
344
 others hold that such entities only 
should be taken into account in the determination of compensation after a breach of the 
standard has been established.
345
 The latter opinion would necessarily preclude any 
utilization of proportionality since the opposing interests thus would be directly collated on 
the basis of a strictly quantitative appraisal. Any method employed for such an operation 
inevitably collapses into a simple mathematical summation.
346
 Investment practice, 
however, seem to favour the balancing approach: In Saluka v Czech Republic, the tribunal 
states this clearly in articulating that „the determination of a breach of [the fair and 
equitable treatment standard] by the Czech Republic [...] requires a weighting of the 
claimant‟s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the respondent‟s 
legitimate regulatory interests on the other‟347. That position would also seem to have been 





, Pope & Talbot v Canada
350
 and Enron v Argentina
351
 awards 
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among others. The most conspicuous conclusion would thus be to assume that the fair and 





5.4.2 Proportionality’s potential 
Concluding that the fair and equitable treatment standard incorporates balancing, one 
of the first questions the Xanadu-tribunal will face when reviewing the RDA‟s allegation of 
a breach of this standard is thus how it should go about in undertaking the required 
balancing operation. Again, since the standard is contained in a treaty, the tribunal might 
look to article 31 of the Vienna Convention for inspiration. As developed above, fair and 
equitable treatment is a fairly vague concept, whereby both the ordinary meaning of the 
term and its object and purpose convey little guidance.
353
 In tune with the argumentation of 
section 2.3, however, case law may also be taken into account based on its persuasiveness. 
The Xanadu-tribunal is therefore prone to turn to earlier international investment law 
arbitration awards for advice.  
Starting off with the Saluka award since this one contained the most obvious 
endorsement of balancing; its lengthy assessment of whether the Czech Republic had 
breached the fair and equitable treatment standard does not contain any explicit utilization 
of proportionality.
 354
 It may be that the tribunal took the norms, interests and values of the 
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state into account when reviewing the latter‟s conduct,355 but it did not formally do so by 
way of proportionality‟s methodological framework. Similar behaviour is apparent in the 
other cited awards as well.
356
 The trend seems instead to be that emphasis is placed on the 
state‟s conduct relative to the investors‟ expectations, with the state‟s interests but applied 
as a backdrop.
357
 This would seem to contrast the more active approach of proportionality 
which emphasizes not only the relation between the state‟s and the investor‟s interests 
(through the proportionality stricto sensu test), but also the state‟s duty to choose the least 
excessive of any reasonably available alternative measures (through the necessity test). 
Thus, if the Xanadu-tribunal was to follow the case law trend when evaluating Xanadu‟s 
possible breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard of article 5 of the US-Xanadu 
BIT, it would rather approach the balancing process indirectly through a reasonable 
expectations assessment than utilize the proportionality standard to equate the opposing 
positions directly. 
Does this mean that proportionality‟s potential is negligible in the context of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard? De lege lata, that would currently seem to be the case, 
but the postulate have earned some critical remarks de lege ferenda: On the one hand, 
proportionality, through its three-step framework, functionally comprises a fairly 
comprehensive method under which more than but a collation of the opposing legal 
positions is undertaken.
358
 The necessity test may, in other words, be considered to 
functionally stretch beyond the scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard which in 
essence limits its balancing component to but a weighting of the competing interests 
involved.
359
 If so, the proportionality principle should probably be excluded as a standard 
of review alternative for balancing in this context because it inherently incorporates 
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elements that the operative legal concept under review does not accommodate. 
On the other hand, proportionality does, as seen, provide a fairly comprehensive 
methodological framework that promotes juridical predictability and consistency.
360
 It may 
thereby be argued that „although the [fair and equitable treatment standard] enhances 
arbitral flexibility, its very elasticity raises anxieties about (a) the scope of arbitral authority 
[...], and (b) the determinacy of rulings [...]. If one accepts that these worries are well-
founded, then one can also see why the adoption of proportionality would make sense, in so 
far as it would inject a measure of analytic, or procedural, determinacy to the balancing 
exercise. Moreover, proportionality, properly used, requires arbitrators to reduce the losses 
accruing to the loser as much as is legally possible, thus enhancing their legitimacy‟361.362 
The Xanadu-tribunal may find the rationale of this argument convincing enough to break 
with the consistency of international investment law arbitration practice and instead base its 
review of the fair and equitable treatment standard of article 5 of the US-Xanadu BIT on 
the proportionality standard. 
 
5.5 Proportionality in other contexts 
This section is intended as a short discussion on the utilization and diffusion of 
proportionality throughout the parts of international investment law not already discussed. 
Short it is since proportionality, as shall be seen, not has been utilized very much at all in 
such contexts.  
 
5.5.1 In theory 
Proportionality is a framework utilizable for equating two or more differing legal 
positions. It represents a three-step analytical tool that an international investment law 
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arbitration tribunal may employ when faced with a situation under which it is forced to 
balance any opposing legal norms, interests and values. Thus, proportionality is, in theory, 
a concept of general procedural applicability: Whenever a juridical predicament whose 
solution depends on balancing presents itself, the arbitration tribunal faced with it may 
resort to the proportionality framework. 
To illustrate this point, a couple of examples are merited. Returning to the RDA-
Xanadu case, its factual basis may be expanded to accommodate a range of balancing 
situations. For instance, assuming that the BIT between the US and Xanadu contained a 
non-disclosure provision relating to state secrets on Xanadu‟s side and confidential 
business information on the investor‟s (RDA‟s) side, that provision might be limited only 
to use of said information clearly contrary to some essential interests of the parties. Any 
subsequent award relating to it would thereby necessarily have to incorporate a balancing 
of those interests against the rights of non-disclosure protected by the provision. Similarly, 
if the BIT included any article allocating a duty to the RDA or Xanadu, but with the 
qualification that compliance with it not constitutes an unreasonable responsibility relative 
to the interests of the duty bound party, a tribunal assessing whether conduct contrary to the 
duty constitutes a breach of the BIT will face a juridical situation under which it must 
balance the interests protected by the duty with the interests protected by the qualification 
of reasonableness. Both these balancing situations could be resolved by way of the 
proportionality standard of review. 
 
5.5.2 In practice 
Besides the instances already accounted for, proportionality has only been utilized 
once in international investment law arbitration practice. That invocation occurred in 2003 
in the Tecmed v Mexico ICSID arbitration. Mexican authorities did not renew a temporary 
operating license for a waste landfill held by a subsidiary of Tecmed, a Spanish company. 
Tecmed claimed that this omission, given the circumstances of the case, constituted an 
indirect (de facto) expropriation that was compensable under article 5 of the BIT between 
Spain and Mexico (the Spain-Mexico Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
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Protection of Investments) as the equivalent of expropriation.
363
 The tribunal held that „it is 
generally understood that [indirect expropriation] materializes through actions or conduct, 
which do not explicitly express the purpose of depriving one rights or assets, but actually 
have that effect‟364. It furthermore stated that the expropriatory character of state actions 
was relative to the balance between the public interests presumably protected thereby and 
the protection granted to investors. „Although the analysis starts at the due deference owing 
to the State when defining the issues that affect its public policy or the interests of society 
as a whole, as well as the actions that will be implemented to protect such values, such 
situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal, without thereby questioning such due 
deference, from examining the actions of the State in light of Article 5(1) of the Agreement 
to determine whether such measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, the 
deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such 
deprivation. There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge 
or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any 
expropriatory measure‟365. The tribunal then went on to conduct a detailed proportionality 




The Tecmed v Mexico award thereby placed all emphasis on the final stage of the 
three-step proportionality framework. Some notes on the necessity test may be found 
entwined in the proportionality stricto sensu assessment,
367
 but the tribunal‟s approach 
cannot be said to strictly adhere to the proportionality formula outlined in section 3.1. 
However, relative to the alternative standards of review presented in section 5.1.2, the 
method utilized in Tecmed v Mexico must be said to favour proportionality as the preferred 
standard of review for balancing situations similar to the one there assessed. Indeed, in 
highlighting the proportionality stricto sensu analysis as much as it does, the award more or 
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less excludes any other standard of review than proportionality since none but that one 
incorporates proportionality stricto sensu test. It may definitely be criticized for jumbling 
the necessity and proportionality stricto sensu stages, thereby deterring juridical 
consistency and predictability,
368
 but it still must be considered an argument for the 
proportionality standard within international investment law per se.
 369
 
In conclusion, when determining whether a state measure may be considered indirectly 
expropriatory, the Tecmed v Mexico award not only purports that a balancing of competing 
interests is called for,
370
 but also pushes the assessing tribunal in the direction of 
proportionality. It would appear that this sentiment is implicitly endorsed by the LG&E v 
Argentina award.
371
 From it all may be inferred that though proportionality not yet has 
attained total diffusion throughout international investment law, it does seem somewhat 
established as the preferred balancing method within some important sectors. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
This, final, chapter is intended to draw together all of the above argumentation in 
articulating a few concluding remarks on the issue of the present state and potential of 
proportionality in international investment law. Section 6.1 will try to enunciate a 
conclusion as to the extent of proportionality‟s present actual impact, while section 6.2 will 
advance some final opinions as to the utility of proportionality in terms of usability and 
practical prospects. Both sections assume familiarity with the discussions, references and 
conclusions articulated above as they are not intended develop new arguments, but rather 
consolidate the ones already advanced. 
 
6.1 So, are we there yet? 
In short; not quite, but there definitely are trends presently pulling international 
investment law towards a greater reliance on proportionality. Within NPM clause 
evaluation for instance, perhaps one of the most tangible areas of balancing in international 
investment law at the moment, the current configuration of interpretative factors would 
seem to favour proportionality:
372
 The Continental Casualty award relies heavily on that 
standard of review in its assessment of whether Argentina might be precluded from 
liability, and as the most recent and, so-far, only unannulled decision of consequence 
relating to this question, it might, as seen, be argued to articulate the present operative 
juridical status regarding NPM clause evaluation in an international investment law 
context. An annulment decision on Continental Casualty is pending though, whereupon the 
ICSID Annulment Committee has the potential to either topple the budding trend or, 
perhaps preferably,
373
 add credence to its premise by firmly endorsing its utilization of 
proportionality as the preferred standard of review. 
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Proportionality also seems to hold some ground within the context of balancing under 
an assessment relating to alleged indirect expropriation: The tribunal of Tecmed v Mexico 
relied heavily on a proportionality stricto sensu analysis in its appraisal of whether Mexico 
was liable for compensation, and the only formal standard of review that incorporates the 
proportionality stricto sensu test is proportionality. Thus, subsequent tribunals may be 
inclined to utilize the proportionality framework if they are to follow up on the path set out 
on by the Tecmed award. However, Tecmed v Mexico is starting to age a bit without any 
new awards directly adopting its argumentation having been released. International 
investment law meanwhile has developed at a rapid pace, whereupon the relative 
persuasiveness of the award might be starting to diminish. On the other hand, no new 
arguments against the utilization of proportionality within this context have subsequently 
surfaced, and proportionality also does possess a certain general utility. 
In relation to fair and equitable treatment evaluations and the necessity defence based 
on article 25 of the Draft Articles of State Responsibility, proportionality does presently not 
seem to be the favoured method of assessment. While tribunals evaluating the former, 
though not directly dismissive of proportionality, seem to apply a slightly different 
balancing approach altogether, tribunals appraising the latter definitely utilize another 
standard of review alternative specifically. It should hereunder be noted, though, that article 
25 of the Draft Articles reflects customary law at the international level in general, 
whereupon international investment law not may change its content single-handedly. Thus, 
the fact that proportionality not is the preferred standard of review in this context stands 
perhaps somewhat apart, as a special case scenario, from the question of diffusion of 
proportionality as such within international investment law. Too much reliance should, in 
other words, not be put on an argument discounting proportionality‟s potential in 
international investment law on the basis of it not being the preferred standard of review 
within the context of the customary necessity defence. 
In total, proportionality is being utilized in some important investment law balancing 
situations (NPM clauses and indirect expropriations), but not in others (fair and equitable 
treatment). Relative to only a few years back (before Continental Casualty and Tecmed), its 
significance has increased. A conclusion might thus be that proportionality currently holds 
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a sectorial dominance as the preferred standard of review in some considerable parts of 
international investment law, and that its sphere of influence is expanding. If this trend 
continues, proportionality might very well end up being adopted on a general basis by 
investment tribunals within a decade or two, tribunals who thereby would follow the in 




6.2 The utility of proportionality 
As was briefly discussed in section 1.1, the economical importance of international 
investment law is on the rise both in absolute and relative terms. There are indications that 
the recent international credit crisis may boost this effect: Foreign investors have been 
treated discriminatory relative to national investors in terms of gaining advantages from the 
emergency measures implemented to counteract the crisis (so-called “national 
treatment”),375 and those covered by BITs, MITs or investment contracts that prohibit such 
treatment may very well choose to initiate arbitrational proceedings against the host states 
in question on the basis of the latter breaching said legal instruments. The investors may 
also assert that this conduct constituted a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. As the states typically may take the path of Argentina in defending their measures 
by way of NPM provisions and/or the customary necessity defence, balancing may become 
an (even more) essential part of arbitration practice in the years to come: As seen in chapter 
5; the evaluation of NPM clauses, the customary necessity defence and the fair and 
equitable treatment standard all require the tribunal to conduct a weighting of opposing 
norms interests and values, and thereby the question of which standard of review it is to 
utilize when conducting those operations will possibly be allocated considerable attention. 
Proportionality may hereunder not only be considered as a standard of review choice 
currently holding some actual merits, but also as a best-practice alternative. It represents a 
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unique procedural framework for several reasons: First of all, among the alternatives 
presented in this thesis (which, as seen, are the ones presently accounted for in an 
international legal context), proportionality is the only one that explicitly incorporates both 
a weighting of the state measure relative to alternative measures the state could have 
implemented (necessity), and a weighting of the state measure relative to the importance of 
the opposing norms interests and values (proportionality stricto sensu). It is arguable that 
both of these steps are required to achieve reasonable legal results under all conditions: If 
the necessity stage is thought away, the state would be justified in implementing any 
measure regardless of whether less restrictive equally effective alternatives existed. If the 
proportionality stricto sensu stage is thought away, the state would be justified in 
implementing any measure however disproportionate in relation to the investor‟s interests. 
While tribunals, such as the WTO Appellate Body, from time to time have jumbled the 
steps together into a combined, somewhat opaque, assessment,
376
 a standard of review that 
embraces them both through a formal framework must be considered the better alternative 
in terms of juridical predictability and consistency.  
Second, proportionality injects „a measure of analytic, or procedural, determinacy to 
the balancing exercise‟377: Balancing has, as seen, been criticized for legitimizing juridical 
law-making, thereby allowing a tribunal to dabble in complex value-laden and empirical 
issues best left for elected representatives, and possibly undermine the state‟s legislative 
authority. Such fears, however, may be mitigated by a clear, predictable and consequent 
balancing process under which the tribunal is bound by a methodological framework to 
assess the crucial component parts of the weighting of the opposing interests in a nested 
sequence of logical steps. Thereby, the feared collapse of the process into an ex aequo et 
bono assessment may be contained at the procedural level. As shown just above, 
proportionality represents the only balancing framework that explicitly takes into account 
all the intrinsic component parts of the balancing process. Furthermore, it is a wide-ranging 
method of analysis, usable under more or less any thinkable scenario. It thus represents the 
best-practice alternative along this axis. 
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Third, proportionality may also help legitimize the arbitration process. An inherent 
strain on the latter is that while it one the one hand is entirely dependent on the consent of 
the parties, and thus on the perception that it is neutral vis-à-vis the dispute, it on the other 
hand is forced to declare a winner and a looser and thereby possibly erode that 
perception.
378
 If utilizing the proportionality framework, however, the tribunal has the 
opportunity to pay respect to the relative positions of both parties throughout the balancing 
procedure, and thereby alleviate the possible distress of the eventual looser. It forces the 
tribunal to do this explicitly and also promotes predictability by indicating to the parties the 
type and sequence of the arguments they have to make in order to cover the path the 
tribunal will take through its assessment.  
Fourth, as seen in section 3.2, the current diffusion of proportionality is considerable 
both in a national and international context. By endorsing of its prospects, international 
investment law would thus join forces with a host of likeminded juridical subject areas.
379
 
It might be argued that such confluence may constitute certain scale advantages in terms of 
general juridical predictability, consistency and development. 
Returning finally to Xanadu and the RDA, it is presumable that the tribunal will apply 
proportionality only to its assessment of the NPM defence. The interpretations of the US-
Xanadu BIT and the Draft Articles of State Responsibility currently do not support a more 
excessive utilization of the method. If one general, underlying trend was to be accentuated 
on the basis of the analysis in which the Xanadu case has been used as illustrative material 
however, it would be its prevalent emphasise on principles as opposed to rules: The 
discussion on the juridical topography of international investment law that both 
commentators and practitioners presently seem to be committed to definitely appears to be 
principle-based. An application of principles in turn leads to balancing, balancing requires 
a method, and the most advantageous method is, for the reasons just discussed, 
proportionality. 
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